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IN PURSUIT OF A NEXT GENERATION
NETWORK FOR PUBLIC SAFETY
COMMUNICATIONS
Philip J. Weisert and Dale N. Hatfield'
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 11-12, 2007, in Washington, D.C., the University of Colorado Law
School's Silicon Flatirons Program convened a roundtable on public safety
communications ("Roundtable") to tackle the increasingly high-profile and
often acrimonious issues surrounding the status of public safety communica-
tions in the United States. This Roundtable successfully brought together par-
ticipants with affiliations spanning a variety of disparate stakeholders and
highlighted a series of important issues for policymakers. l
Overall, the Roundtable discussion emphasized that technological changes
and policy reforms can spur the development of a next generation network
t Phil Weiser is a Professor of Law and Telecommunications and Executive Director of
the Silicon Flatirons Program at the University of Colorado. This Article results from a two
day conference convened by the Silicon Flatirons Program to evaluate solutions for advanc-
ing the state of public safety communications. The perspective offered herein is that of the
authors-who endeavored to glean insights from the discussion, identify points of rough
consensus, and, in general, draw on the discussion from the conference from the standpoint
of an informed observer. The authors alone are responsible for the views set forth herein and
they should not be attributed to any of the participants in the conference. The authors ac-
knowledge Jill Van Matre, who conducted critical background research and provided valu-
able feedback on the report, as well as Brad Bernthal, Harlin McEwen, Jon Peha and Bryan
Tramont, who provided helpful comments and encouragement. Finally, the authors ac-
knowledge a grant from CTIA-The Wireless Association®, which supported the Roundta-
ble and relevant background research.
1 Dale Hatfield is an Adjunct Professor in the Interdisciplinary Telecommunications
Program at the University of Colorado.
I Participants included leaders in the public safety community, wireless service provid-
ers, device manufacturers, engineers, and key scholars. Significantly, those participants are
not responsible for the contents of this article, although the relevant participants have ap-
proved any statements attributed to them.
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("NGN") for public safety communications. 2 Significantly, such a network
would facilitate both greater levels of operability and interoperability between
networks. Operability refers to the ability of communications systems to func-
tion effectively, reliably, and continuously. Interoperability refers to the ability
of different first responders to communicate with one another in real-time,
whether or not they are using different communications systems. Stated
broadly, interoperability signifies "the ability of emergency response providers
and relevant Federal, State, and local government agencies to communicate
with each other as necessary ... utilizing information technology systems and
radio communications systems, and to exchange voice, data, or video with one
another... in real time, as necessary."
3
An NGN network will also enable public safety entities to utilize new tech-
nologies that will enhance their effectiveness. In particular, such a network will
facilitate the adoption of new broadband and Internet-based technologies by
public safety agencies. In developing and deploying this network, however, it
is important to appreciate, as a number of Roundtable participants emphasized,
that policymakers also need to address the immediate need of finding cost-
effective solutions to enable interoperability across today's legacy public
safety networks. To both promote an NGN as well as manage today's networks
effectively, policymakers will need to develop a thoughtful strategic vision and
use considerable leadership to put it into practice.
By adopting a new model for promoting public safety communications as
part of the auction for 700 MHz spectrum and the assignment of a block of
spectrum to a public safety broadband licensee, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") has taken an important step toward the development of a
nationwide interoperable broadband communications network.4 To advance
2 As discussed below, the concept of a "next generation network" refers to the architec-
ture used in modem commercial networks, which facilitates convergence-the delivery of
video, data, and voice traffic over a single network-through the use of technologies based
on the Internet Protocol ("IP").
3 H.R. REP. No. 108-796, at 213 (2004) (Conf. Rep.).
4 See In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands; Revision
of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling
Systems; Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible
Telephones; Biennial Regulatory Review-Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and 90 to
Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services; Former
Nextel Communications, Inc. Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part
27 of the Commission's Rules; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Pub-
lic Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Development of Operational, Technical and Spec-
trum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communications
Requirements Through the Year 2010; Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Requirement under
Commission's Part I Anti-Collusion Rule, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
(July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Spectrum Auction Rules Order]; see also In re Implementing a
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this policy effectively, policymakers will need to be realistic about the time
and effort needed to implement a fundamental change in public safety commu-
nications-particularly under significant technical and financial constraints.
Moreover, policymakers must recognize that no system will be perfect, mean-
ing that they will need to make compromises between the ideal level of cover-
age, reliability, and financial constraints.
From a homeland security perspective, the current operability and interop-
erability limitations of public safety communications systems are detrimental
to national and local emergency response capabilities and risk the lives of both
first responders and ordinary citizens. Moreover, these weaknesses of current
systems are a day-to-day reality for public safety agencies,5 who continue to
use equipment far less sophisticated than their corporate counterparts. Thus,
until progress is made along a new policy direction, antiquated equipment and
networks will continue to be used and first responders will continue to be lim-
ited by the shortcomings of today's public safety communications infrastruc-
ture.
This article reflects a unique combination of the authors' perspectives on an
important public policy problem as well as the deliberations of the Roundtable.
In general, it attempts to distill the analysis and suggestions presented during
the Roundtable's discussion into a coherent description of the challenges fac-
ing public safety communications and the near- and long-term solutions for
solving these challenges. Part II begins by providing a technological back-
ground, including an explanation of the evolution of modem public safety
communications systems and their corresponding technological and opera-
tional limitations. It also addresses the technological requirements, architec-
ture, and possible constraints associated with an NGN. Part III examines
strategies for implementing a next generation architecture. It begins by describ-
ing the historical regulatory strategies and then proceeds to analyze possible
policy strategies for an NGN, along with the associated challenges and oppor-
tunities. Part IV sets forth key concerns for the transition period, including
working within the current technological framework, building a sustainable
funding base, and establishing clear requirements and standards. Part V offers
a short conclusion.
Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Devel-
opment of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State
and Local Public Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010, Ninth
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 14,837, 3-4 (Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter
Ninth NPRM] (noting the Commission's intent to maximize public safety via reserved
broadband spectrum).
5 See Jon M. Peha, Improving Public Safety Communications, ISSUES Sci. & TECH.,
Winter 2007, available at http://www.issues.org/23.2/peha.html.
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II. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
In order to fully appreciate the technological choices now facing public
safety agencies, it is important to understand: (1) the evolution of public safety
communications systems; (2) the technological and operational limitations of
such systems; (3) the requirements and architecture associated with a public
safety NGN; and (4) the essential considerations that will inform and, in some
cases, constrain the development of an NGN designed to meet the needs of
public safety in the coming decades. This Part discusses each in turn.
A. The Evolution of Modem Public Safety Communications Systems6
1. Technological History
Land Mobile Radio ("LMR") services date back almost a century. The De-
troit Police Department engaged in one of the earliest uses of LMR, experi-
menting with a one-way (base-to-vehicle) system in 1921. These early voice
systems used Amplitude Modulation ("AM") located just above the AM
broadcast band in the Medium Frequency portion of the radio spectrum. The
first license for a mobile transmitter was issued in 1932. Soon thereafter, the
first Very High Frequency ("VHF") band came into use and, more recently,
radios using the more effective Frequency Modulation ("FM") band were in-
troduced. Over time, increased use of LMR systems by public and private enti-
ties led to the opening of another band higher in the VHF region. These two
mobile radio bands in the 40 MHz and 150 MHz portion of the VHF range
became known as Low Band and High Band respectively.
The early voice systems operating at both Low Band and High Band con-
sisted essentially of a base station transmitter-receiver combination, an antenna
tower and antenna, and the individual mobile transmitter-receiver units (trans-
ceivers). These early systems operated in the push-to-talk, release-to-listen
mode and provided voice dispatch services using a single frequency for both
transmitting and receiving. Because of an overall scarcity of frequencies, these
channels were often shared with other networks or operators.
With the continuing growth in LMR services, the FCC allotted additional
spectrum for public safety uses in the Ultra-High Frequency ("UHF") portion
of the radio spectrum. The FCC allocated two frequencies for each channel of
communications-one to transmit and one to receive. Providing a pair of fre-
6 Portions of Part II.A are drawn directly from Dale N. Hatfield, The Technology Basis
for Wireless Communications, in THE EMERGING WORLD OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 49
(1996).
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quencies created several advantages, including reduction of the interference
between the higher power base stations and the typically much lower power
mobile units. Most significantly from a public safety perspective, this architec-
ture allowed for the introduction of repeaters, which can provide greatly in-
creased geographic coverage, especially for mobile-to-mobile and portable-to-
portable communications. In most cases, the repeater is installed on a very high
tower, building, or mountaintop.
As illustrated in Figure 1, a repeater receives a low-power mobile, portable
or base station signal on one frequency and retransmits it at high power on the
second frequency of the pair. Due to its advantageous location, the repeater can
normally receive and transmit over a wide area. The result is that two low-
power mobile or portable units that are located only a few miles apart, but are
unable to communicate, can now successfully communicate via the repeater
because they are both within its line-of-sight. This arrangement facilitates the
rapid voice call setup and group calling among and between a dispatcher and
field units.
Figure 1: Conventional Repeater System
FlRxF1
'- '.F2 Tx F
A~Rx F2
Mobil.
Mobile
Use of conventional dispatch systems grew rapidly throughout the late
1960s, leading the FCC to again make available additional spectrum for public
safety LMR systems. 7 In so doing, the FCC sought to encourage the develop-
ment and deployment of systems that utilized the increasingly scarce radio
spectrum on a more efficient basis.
8
7 See In re Amendment of Parts 2, 89, 91, and 93; Geographic Reallocation of UHF TV
Channels 14 Through 20 to Land Mobile Radio Services for Use Within the 25 Largest
Urbanized Areas of the United States; Petition Filed by the Telecommunications Committee
of the National Association of Manufacturers to Permit Use of TV Channels 14 and 15 by
Land Mobile Stations in the Los Angeles Area, First Report and Order, 23 F.C.C. 2d 325
(May 20, 1970).
8 See id.
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One way of improving spectrum efficiency was through the use of "trunk-
ing." In contrast to conventional systems, the individual channels in a trunked
system are placed into a pool and made available to different groups of users
on an on-demand basis. Specifically, a dispatcher or mobile unit desiring to
make a call (or transmission) is given a channel to use for the duration of the
call, and at the end of the call, the channel is returned to the pool for use by
other users. With trunking, a call or transmission can be completed if any of
the channels in the pool are idle and, conversely, a call is not blocked or
queued unless all channels in the pool are busy.
Without trunking, each dispatcher (base) or mobile unit operates on a single
channel that may be shared with other licensees. Thus, a dispatcher desiring to
make a call cannot do so if that single channel is busy. In such an instance, the
dispatcher cannot complete the call (it is blocked or queued) even though it is
very likely that other single channels in the geographic area may be unused at
that moment. Finally, users of an untrunked (conventional) single channel can-
not make that channel available to users on other channels even if the
untrunked channel is not being used.
Systems employing trunking are known as multi-channel trunked systems
and one popular form utilizes what is known as centralized trunking. 9 With
centralized trunking, status information (busy or idle) on each channel in the
pool is maintained in a central controller and one channel from the pool is des-
ignated as a control channel. Idle dispatcher and mobile units monitor the con-
trol channel. If a unit initiates a call by pushing the push-to-talk button, it sends
a signaling message on the control channel to the central controller identifying
the called group and requesting a channel from the pool. The central controller
identifies an idle channel and responds on the control channel with a signaling
message that instructs the calling and called units to tune to the selected idle
channel. Units that are not members of the called group continue to monitor
the control channel. The conversation can begin when the calling and called
units arrive on the selected channel. In a modem multi-channel trunked system,
this entire process (the call setup time) occurs in less than one-half second.
Trunking can provide dramatic improvements in spectrum efficiency and
performance (in terms of fewer blocked or delayed calls) and offers other im-
portant advantages as well, such as the sharing of channels so that individual
channels are pooled rather than dedicated to a particular user. Thus, in the mid-
1970s, when the FCC allocated additional spectrum in the 800 MHz band for
9 See generally SAFECOM, COMPARISONS OF CONVENTIONAL AND TRUNKED SYSTEMS 9
(1999), available at http://www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F04A685D-5902-4655-
BBBB-
7251DCDF4693/O/ConventionalTrunkedRadioSystemsComparisonReport.pdf
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private LMR (including public safety entities), it authorized not only conven-
tional, single-channel dispatch systems, but also multi-channel trunked sys-
tems. 10
The use of sophisticated signaling and computer logic in the centralized con-
troller of a modem multi-channel trunked system facilitates the inclusion of
advanced features that are particularly important in public safety applications.
If, for example, the number of calls is very heavy due to emergency conditions,
higher-priority calls can be moved to the head of the queue and given the next
channel that becomes available. Or, in the alternative, an existing lower-
priority call can be preempted by a higher-priority call.
Perhaps the most important aspect to this improvement is that a multi-
channel trunked system can provide effective interoperability among all dis-
patch and mobile units sharing the system. For example, if two jurisdictions
have separate, conventional, single-channel systems, they may not be able to
communicate with one another in times of emergency. Alternatively, the juris-
dictions may be able to communicate only by employing gateways (cross-band
repeaters) that require difficult coordination and are inefficient in terms of their
use of the radio spectrum. In a multi-channel trunked system, each of the two
jurisdictions would have its own separate talk-group or a "virtual network" that
is defined in the software residing in the central controller. In times of emer-
gency, units in the two jurisdictions can join pre-formed virtual networks that
allow efficient communications between and among the units in both jurisdic-
tions. Of course, such opportunities require ongoing cooperation (multi-agency
agreements), such as that necessary to maintain shared access to different data-
bases. "1
In the early 1990s, the public safety community sought to take advantage of
the opportunity to deploy modem multi-channel trunked systems by launching
an effort to develop standards that would further facilitate interoperability. This
effort evolved into the Project 25 Initiative ("P25"), which utilizes a standard-
ized air interface and standardized signaling messages.12
10 In re An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz;
and Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91, and 93 of the Rules Relative to Opera-
tions in the Land Mobile Service Between 806 and 906 MHz, Second Report and Order, 46
F.C.C. 2d 752, 16-17 (May 1, 1974).
1 The degree of cooperation among agencies required and the complexity of the admin-
istrative issues involved (e.g., in keeping multiple databases operational and current) in
these multi-agency agreements should not be underestimated.
12 See Telecomms. Indus. Ass'n, Project 25, Public Safety Communications Interopera-
bility-Frequently Asked Questions Available on TIA Web Site, PULSEONLINE, Oct. 2004,
http://pulse.tiaonline.org/article.cfm?id=2057.
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
2. Relevant Regulatory Background
In 1995, the FCC, in concert with the National Telecommunications and In-
formation Administration ("NTIA"), established the Public Safety Wireless
Advisory Committee ("PSWAC") to assess the public safety communications
needs through the year 2010. In 1996, the PSWAC released a report, which
concluded that 97.5 MHz of new public safety spectrum would be needed by
2010, including 25 MHz by 2001.13
As a result of the PSWAC report, Congress directed the FCC to allocate 24
MHz of spectrum between 746 and 806 MHz to public safety agencies. 14 In
particular, this spectrum will be recovered from television broadcast channels
60-69 as a result of the implementation of digital television ("DTV").' 5 In its
rules governing the uses of that spectrum, the FCC specified that UHF televi-
sion channels 63, 64, 68, and 69 would be designated for public safety.
16
Moreover, the FCC concluded in 1998 that one-half of the new spectrum (12
MHz) would be made available for public safety narrowband voice channels
and the remaining 12 MHz for wideband data channels. 17 Finally, to recom-
mend rules for the use of the new 24 MHz of spectrum in the 700 MHz band,
the FCC created the Public Safety National Coordinating Committee
("NCC"). 18
To date, the FCC's effort to accommodate the growth of private LMR sys-
tems has resulted in public safety allocations spread over five different bands.
In particular, public safety agencies use spectrum in Low Band VHF, High
Band VHF, UHF, 800 MHz, and 700 MHz. 19 Unfortunately, this fragmenta-
tion exacerbates interoperability problems and reduces the ability of vendors to
achieve economies of scale. Moreover, there are differences in performance
13 PUB. SAFETY WIRELESS ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY
WIRELESS COMMITTEE 3 (1996), available at
http://pswac.ntia.doc.gov/pubsafe/publications/PSWACAl.pdf.
14 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
15 In re Reallocation of Television Channels 60-69, the 746-806 MHz Band, Report and
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 22,953, 2-6 (Dec. 31, 1997).
16 Id. 12.
17 In re Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meet-
ing Federal, State and Local Public Safety Agency Communication Requirements Through
the Year 2010; Establishment of Rules and Requirements for Priority Access Service, First
Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 152, 43 (Aug.
6, 1998).
18 Id. 7.
19 The FCC recently allocated an additional 50 MHz of spectrum for public safety use in
the 4.9 GHz band. See In re 4.9 GHz Band Transferred from Federal Government Use,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Third Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 9152, 16
(Apr. 23, 2003). Based on the current technology, the 4.9 GHz band is unsuitable for highly
mobile use and thus is not discussed herein.
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among the bands because of radio propagation variations associated with the
five bands. Consider, for example, that a jurisdiction in an urban area may
prefer a modem digital multi-channel trunked system at 800 MHz when the
need for maximum capacity is great and shorter ranges can be accommodated.
By contrast, a jurisdiction in a rural area may prefer a High Band VHF analog
conventional system because capacity is not a significant issue, but maximum
coverage from a single site is of paramount importance.20
The FCC has traditionally licensed private land mobile radio systems, in-
21
cluding those used by public safety, on a local, site-by-site basis. While there
may be important benefits associated with such a licensing scheme, it tends to
exacerbate the fragmentation. In addition, conventional public safety channels
are typically shared with other public safety users. Without the more disci-
plined approach to channel access provided by a trunked system, there are
powerful incentives for local public safety agencies to acquire and retain their
own channels, even if they are not heavily used. In the absence of a multi-
channel trunked system serving multiple agencies or in the face of a refusal by
an individual agency to join such a system (because a conventional analog
system is more economical), opportunities for interoperability, greater spec-
trum efficiency, and larger economies of scale are lost.
In a further attempt to accommodate the growth in private land mobile radio
use, the FCC has embarked upon a lengthy proceeding to create additional
individual channels by decreasing the width of each voice channel from 25
kHz (the current width) to 12.5 kHz, and perhaps eventually to 6.25 kHz. 22
This channel splitting requirement applies to both public safety and industrial
licensees in the popular VHF and UHF private land mobile radio bands. 23 Un-
20 This is due to the fact that VHF signals travel further than 800 MHz signals in rural
areas. However, there is more spectrum available at 800 MHz than VHF. Since rural areas
do not need as much capacity as urban areas, it is possible to reduce the number of base
stations because the signal will travel farther. Thus, VHF is optimal for rural areas. By con-
trast, greater capacity is needed in urban areas. These areas require more channels, more
frequency reuse, and, ultimately, more base stations. Greater frequency reuse means that
signals do not have to travel as far. Therefore, 800 MHz tends to be optimal in urban areas.
Rural areas forced to use 800 MHz would require more base stations, and, ultimately, a
significant increase in cost.
21 See generally 47 C.F.R. pt. 90 (covering private land mobile radio services regulation
and licensing).
22 See In re Implementation of Sections 3090) and 337 of the Communications Act of
1934 as Amended; Promotion of Spectrum Efficient Technologies on Certain Part 90 Fre-
quencies, Third Memorandum Opinion and Order, Third Further Notice of Proposed Rule
Making and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 25,045, 2 (Dec. 20, 2004).
23 The NTIA has adopted a similar requirement for federal government land mobile
radio users. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING FCC
NARROWBANDING REQUIREMENTS (2007), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/217865.pdf.
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fortunately, "[i]n an ironic twist of lagging policy, at the same time that users
are trying to explain their need for wideband and broadband channels to the
FCC, the most heavily used bands in operation are subject to narrowband-
ing. '' 24 Thus, the narrowband requirement, in the face of industry trends to
move to wider channels (1.25 - 5.00 MHz), may actually further exacerbate
interoperability problems and lead to further losses in terms of economies of
scale.
3. Modern Dispatch Oriented Services for Data, Image, and Video
In addition to public safety voice- and dispatch-oriented wireless communi-
cations systems, there exist more advanced systems that are capable of han-
dling data, image, and video traffic. Before advanced data and multimedia
capabilities can play a critical role in public safety communications, however,
agencies will need to adopt new systems while transitioning away from their
old ones. Using today's narrowband (25 kHz) systems (with their low-speed
two-way data communications capabilities), first responders can send brief,
text-based inquiries regarding a vehicle or suspect directly to the National
Crime Information Center or other databases maintained by state or local agen-
cies. Such systems cannot provide, however, the broadband data capabilities of
an NGN, which will enable high quality images (mug shots) and video clips
(scenes from a natural disaster location) to be sent between and among public
safety units.
Despite the potential benefits of advanced data communication features,
speed and reliability in critical tactical situations (such as whether to shoot or
not) remain of significant importance. Thus, while access to building plans and
video coverage at a scene may be extremely useful, public safety officials can-
not take the time to create and read data communications while pursuing a
fleeing suspect, for example. In such situations, nothing can replace voice
communications with rapid call setup and group calling. As such, these mis-
sion-critical capabilities must be maintained as part of public safety communi-
cations.
In short, rapid voice call setup and group calling is the sine qua non of mod-
em public safety voice communications. For ordinary telephone (landline or
wireless) conversations, by contrast, very rapid call setup is not an issue, as it
may take tens of seconds for the called telephone to ring and to be answered.
Because speed is an essential issue in mission-critical public safety operations,
24 NANCY JESUALE & BERNARD C. EYDT, A POLICY PROPOSAL TO ENABLE COGNITIVE
RADIO FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AND INDUSTRY 1N THE LAND MOBILE RADIO BANDS 5 (Feb. 3,
2007), available at http://www.netcityengineering.com/PID354224.pdf.
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modem systems achieve call setup times of one-half second or less. Moreover,
unlike ordinary voice telephony, a dispatch system allows all members of a
talk group to receive the transmissions from all other members of that talk-
group. 25 In particular, calls to individual units and broadcast calls to all units
are possible when using such a system.
Along with fast call setup times and group calling capability, modem dis-
patch systems also provide a number of other important functionalities. First,
agencies may often need to set up multiple talk groups and to change group
membership on a dynamic basis to reflect changing operational and tactical
26needs. Second, another important capability of modem dispatch systems is a
handset feature known as "talk-around," which enables two mobile or portable
units to communicate directly with one another even in the absence of the net-
27work infrastructure. This provides a limited form of failsafe capability in the
event that centralized base station or trunking facilities are out of service, or if
the two units are out of range of those facilities. The talk-around capability can
also be used to off-load local communications from a heavily-loaded wide area
system. Notably, ordinary wireless telephony services do not offer this capabil-
ity as no direct, "infrastructureless," peer-to-peer communications are possible
using such systems.
A third important feature of modem dispatch systems is that they allow call
requests to be queued when all channels are busy. This is in contrast to the
ordinary telephone network, which results in an "all trunks are busy" signal to
the user. Because messages are typically much shorter in a multi-channel dis-
patch system, a channel is more likely to become available in a short time and
there is thus less of a need to immediately return a busy signal. Moreover, the
queuing and associated call processing used by modem dispatch networks can
provide priority access (with multiple priority levels) and, in particularly criti-
cal situations, can allow the preemption of calls in progress. Indeed, more
25 Note that group calling is possible in an ordinary voice telephony system by estab-
lishing a conference call through a conference bridge, but that it is not a substitute for the
group calling utilized by public safety.
26 With respect to talk groups, an additional feature called "late entry" allows a unit that
has just been turned on, or is manually switched from one talk group to another, to join a
conversation already in progress. That is, the late entry does not need to receive the original
signaling message that was used to connect the talk group on a particular conversation
channel.
27 Talk-around functionality was an area stressed by many of the Roundtable partici-
pants. In particular, Vice Chair of the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council,
Harlin McEwen, emphasized its importance, noting that the key issue of reliability should
never be compromised to achieve economies of scale. Moreover, Stephen Meer, Co-
Founder and CTO of Intrado Inc., made the point that although talk-around is used as a
fallback mechanism in modem systems, capacity issues often preclude its effectiveness in
emergency scenarios.
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modem systems offer encryption of public safety communications to provide
greater levels of privacy for sensitive communications.
Finally, to improve or tailor radio system coverage in a given geographic
area, modem dispatch systems employ two additional techniques. First, mod-
em systems are capable of operating in the "simulcast mode," in which an ad-
ditional transmitter is placed in an area needing additional coverage. This addi-
tional transmitter simultaneously emits the same signal sent from the main
transmitter and on the same band. Normally, such a transmitter would cause
severe interference in the geographic area where the signals overlap. However,
by carefully controlling the characteristics of the signals (in terms of carrier
frequency and phase or timing), this interference can be minimized. Simulcast-
ing requires that the main and simulcast sites be connected using a microwave
radio link or leased fixed line, but it provides the benefit of allowing the trans-
mitter or "talk-out" coverage to be optimized without requiring an additional
frequency.
The second technique deals with the opposite issue-"talk-back" range. Be-
cause of their lower power (and associated battery-life issues) and less efficient
antennas, the talk-back range of portable, handheld radios is sometimes less
than the talk-out range of its associated base station. To compensate for this
reduced range in critical areas, remote receivers are often employed in these
places. These remote receivers are, in turn, connected back to the base station
by a fixed link. When multiple remote receivers are employed, the signal from
the remote receiver with the best reception of the signal from the portable is
selected. In this situation, the remote receivers are referred to as "voting re-
ceivers." In combination, simulcasting and remote receivers often overcome
coverage gaps in critical areas.
B. Limitations of Modem Public Safety Systems
As discussed above, early generations of public safety networks focused on
voice communications, used conventional (i.e., non-trunked) single channel
repeaters, used push-to-talk access, and worked in the narrowband, analog
transmission mode. By contrast, later generations continued to focus on voice
communications, used trunked repeaters, used push-to-talk access, and worked
with digital signaling, but continued to use narrowband, analog transmission
for the conversation channels. The current generation of public safety systems
(i.e., P25) still focuses on voice communications, but provides circuit switched
and packet switched data access that is limited in data rate by the narrowband
channels employed. In an advance over their predecessors, they use trunked
repeaters with push-to-talk voice access and employ all-digital transmission in
narrowband channels. Table I depicts the differing attributes of these systems.
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Table 1: Technology of Public Safety Networks Over Time
Early Generation Later Generation Current State of
Public Safety Public Safety Art Public Safety
Network Network Network
Type of Voice Voice Voice
communications communications communications communications
emphasized? with some data
Conventional vs. Conventional sin- Trunked Trunked
trunked gle channel repeaters repeaters
architecture? repeaters
Access method? Push-to-talk access Push-to-talk Push-to-talk
access access
Analog vs. digital Analog Analog transmission All digital
transmission? transmission (but with digital transmission
signaling)
Narrowband vs. Narrowband Narrowband Narrowband
broadband?
In contrast to the commercial cellular market, the market for state-of-the-art
public safety communications equipment (i.e., P25 systems) is much smaller,
more concentrated, and less competitive. Notably, public safety systems are
designed to provide maximum coverage from each site, thus facilitating simul-
taneous communications with individual talk-group users spread over a wide
area. In engineering terms, these are referred to as "noise limited systems" and
the large coverage areas they produce minimize the number of base stations
required to communicate with widely dispersed units, thereby reducing the
associated fixed infrastructure costs.
Commercial cellular systems have evolved over three generations. First
generation systems were voice-oriented, used analog transmission in narrow-
band (30 kHz channels), and employed circuit switching. In the United States,
this generation was exemplified by the Advanced Mobile Phone System stan-
dard. 29 Second generation systems were also voice oriented, but offered some
data capabilities; they were all digital, but still employed circuit switching.
Examples of such systems included GSM, CDMA, iDEN, and, in the United
States, TDMA. In contrast, third generation systems can seamlessly handle
28 See generally ANDREA GOLDSMITH, WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 11-13 (2005).
29 JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 277 (2005).
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voice, data, image, and video traffic, employ packet-oriented switching, and
operate in wideband channels (1.25 MHz), allowing high data rate transmis-
sions roughly comparable to the speeds achievable by early generation wireline
DSL and cable modem services. Examples of these systems include WCDMA
and CDMA 2000. Moreover, because of the highly competitive environment,
the availability of wider channels, and the large manufacturing volumes asso-
ciated with these systems, the capabilities of such systems continue to increase.
In particular, the handsets associated with these systems continue to evolve,
supporting not only voice, but also data, image, and video or multimedia appli-
cations.
The contrast between the third generation cellular systems and the third gen-
eration public safety systems highlights the opportunities for improving the
latter. To be sure, the current (and third) generation of public safety systems
(P25) does a laudable job of meeting the requirements of rapid voice call setup
and group calling among geographically dispersed users. However, aspects of
its technical architecture-including the use of narrowband channels-
essentially preclude such systems from evolving into broadband networks.
This means that systems premised on P25 technology are not capable of evolv-
ing so that they can seamlessly handle voice, data, image, and video traffic on
a common platform (as is happening in the commercial cellular environment).
Certainly, public safety organizations recognize the pressing need for such
broadband capabilities, but they have yet to develop a strategy for modernizing
their current platforms. 
30
While not a technical limitation per se, the market for specialized multi-
channel trunked systems is itself limited by the small size of the public safety
market and by the relatively small purchases made by individual agencies at
any given time. This, in turn, limits economies of scale and reduces competi-
tive pressures because fewer suppliers can be supported. Reflecting the advan-
tages of the commercial cellular equipment ecosystem, "a cell phone with
voice, video, and data capability costs about seven times less than a public
safety digital portable radio that cannot even take a digital photo, much less
send it to another person."
31
30 Hearing on Oversight of the Nat 'l Telecomm. Info. Admin. and Innovations in Inter-
operability Before the Subcomm. On Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007) (written testimony of Harlin R. McEwen, Chairman,
Commc'ns & Tech. Comm., Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs of Police) [hereinafter Testimony of Har-
lin R. McEwen], available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte-mtgs/110-ti-
hrg.032207.McEwen-testimony.pdf.
31 Robert Rouleau, Connecting Data Networks, MISSION CRITICAL COMM., Aug. 2006, at
98, 102.
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Because the public safety communications infrastructure is premised on the
use of narrowband channels and specialized multi-channel trunked systems,
the public safety community cannot directly adopt the commercial cellular
technology into the existing public safety bands. As a result, the public safety
community cannot benefit from economies of scale, competition among ven-
dors, and research and development expenditures associated with the commer-
cial cellular marketplace. Consequently, as one observer noted:
[T]he public safety user community is two orders of magnitude smaller than the
commercial user base. As a result, R&D investments in commercial wireless tech-
nologies dwarf those made in public safety wireless technologies. In addition, the
large size of the commercial wireless market fosters greater levels of cypetition be-
tween vendors of network infrastructure, user devices, and applications.
According to a recent article, a substantial fraction of all public safety sys-
tems still use the same narrowband, analog FM, conventional (untrunked) sys-
tems in the VHF and UHF bands that have existed for decades. 33 In contrast to
users of P25 infrastructure, public safety users of conventional, analog FM
systems are able to take advantage of a competitive market that reflects a broad
array of users for such equipment, including both domestic and international
suppliers working to serve the industrial, transport, maritime, government, and
amateur venues. The resulting lower prices, coupled with the propagation ad-
vantages associated with the VHF and UHF bands, greatly reduce the incen-
tives for public safety agencies (especially outside the larger urban areas) to
deploy modem multi-channel trunked systems, thereby aggravating interop-
erability problems.
The interoperability limitations of public safety infrastructure stem from
three principal factors. First, as noted above, the use of different technologies
at the state, local, and federal levels of government, ranging from legacy FM
conventional systems to proprietary analog and digital multi-channel trunked
systems to modem standardized P25 digital multi-channel trunked systems,
make interoperability between networks difficult to achieve. Second, as dis-
cussed above, the historical developments that led to public safety systems
being licensed in five separate spectrum bands spanning a range from 25 MHz
to 866 MHz also complicate any interoperability solution. Finally, the long-
standing policy of licensing public safety radio systems on a local level (in-
deed, on a channel-by-channel, site-by-site basis) creates a tradition of local
autonomy and sometimes raises barriers to cooperation.
32 Krishna Balachandran et al., Mobile Responder Communication Networks for Public
Safety, IEEE COMM. MAG., Jan. 2006, at 56.
33 JESUALE & EYDT, supra note 24, at 3.
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1. Interoperability Solutions
The lack of interoperability between public safety communications systems
became a national tragedy on 9/11 when first responders were not able to com-
municate with one another. Responding to this failing, policymakers have
pushed a variety of proposals. In reviewing the possible options, it is useful to
distinguish between three parts of a telecommunications network-(1) the end-
user devices; (2) the local access portion of the network; and (3) the wide area
or core portion of the network-because solutions can be implemented at any
of these points.
In a traditional commercial cellular network, the end-user devices are ordi-
nary cell phones; the access portion of the network includes the base stations
and microwave or other links for connecting the base stations to the Mobile
Switching Center ("MSC"); and the wide area portion of the network includes
the facilities used to interconnect the MSCs to each other and to the public
switched telephone network. In a modem P25 public safety system, the end-
user devices are mobile and portable radios built to the P25 standard; the ac-
cess network includes the P25 base stations plus microwave or other links
(telephone company provided leased lines) to connect the base stations to the
centralized P25 switch controller. In addition, if it is a network covering a large
geographic area, the wide area portion includes the facilities for interconnect-
ing multiple switch controller nodes.
Figure 2: Interoperability Solutions 
34
Jurisdictional
Coverage Area of Boundary
System i ao
Stb Se S Coverage Area ofSystemm
Technology I
System 2
• Technology 2
j ./ Band 2
Overlapping
Coverage Area ...
34 Figure 2 is adapted from a slide in a presentation entitled "Interoperability, Public
Safety and Homeland Security" by Steve Sharkey, Director of Spectrum and Standards
Strategy at Motorola, presented at the Law Seminars International Conference on Spectrum
Rights and Management, Washington, D.C., Sept. 19, 2006.
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Figure 2 provides one perspective on available interoperability solutions.
The circle on the left represents the coverage area of Public Safety System 1,
which is operating in band I and using access technology 1. For example, Pub-
lic Safety System I could be operating a multi-channel, P25 trunked system
digital access network in the 800 MHz band. The circle on the right depicts the
coverage area of Public Safety System 2, which is operating in band 2 and
using access technology 2. This system could be operating in the UHF (450
MHz) band using conventional analog FM repeaters as the access technology.
(Note that there is some overlap between the two systems.)
To appreciate the nature of the interoperability issue, consider what options
there are in the event of a large emergency at a location within the overlapping
coverage area (marked with a star in Figure 2). For the sake of the example,
assume that the incident is within the jurisdiction of the agency operating Pub-
lic Safety System 1, but it is of such a nature that it requires assistance from
mobile units in Public Safety System 2. Consequently, a successful response to
the event will require that the end-user devices used in Public Safety System 2
communicate with the end-user devices used in Public Safety System 1.
Conceptually, interoperability between Public Safety System 1 and Public
Safety System 2 can be achieved in three different ways: end-user device solu-
tions, access network solutions, and network-based solutions. First, the arriving
mobile unit from Public Safety System 2 could utilize a multi-band, multi-
mode radio (or a software defined radio equivalent) capable of operating on the
access network of Public Safety System 1. This exemplifies an end-user device
solution. Such solutions are still developing and, at present, are not used to any
substantial degree because of their higher cost, greater weight, and lower bat-
tery life. Moreover, the complexity of such solutions increases dramatically as
the number of modes and bands increase.
Second, although difficult in practice, the access network in Public Safety
System 1 could be reconfigured (using software defined radio technology, for
example) to work with the end-user device from Public Safety System 2 with-
out any changes to that end-user device (except perhaps for a change in chan-
nels within band 2). This solution, even if not practicable using today's tech-
nology, represents an access network solution.
Third, in this area of overlapping coverage, Public Safety System 1 units are
able to maintain contact with their switch controller and Public Safety System
2 units are likewise able to maintain contact with their switch controller. As a
result, the wide area or core network connection between the two switch con-
troller nodes (shown as a dotted line in Figure 2) could be used with certain
functionality within the two nodes to interconnect or provide a "gateway" be-
tween the two systems. This is an example of a network-based solution. If the
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two switch controllers use a common standard (e.g., P25), such interconnection
is relatively straightforward.
In evaluating the appeal of a gateway solution, it is important to realize that
it, too, has a notable limitation. In particular, it is important to note that while
gateway solutions allow conversations on a channel in one system to be heard
on a channel in a second system and vice versa, such a solution requires two
channels to be effective--one on each system. If the traffic is relatively light
on the combined channels, spectrum is wasted because a single channel could
otherwise handle all of the traffic. But where the traffic on the combined chan-
nels is heavy, overload and unsatisfactory performance may occur when the
two channels are bridged. In short, gateways in general are not always spec-
trum efficient and, unless other steps are taken, the use of gateway solutions
may decrease performance under heavy traffic loads.
The analysis of the appropriate interoperability solution changes if the
emergency occurs is inside the coverage area of Public Safety System 1, but
outside the coverage area of Public Safety System 2 (marked with an asterisk
in Figure 2). The first two types of solutions-the end-user device solution and
the access network solution-would still work to provide interoperability. The
network-based solutions, by contrast, would not work because the mobile units
associated with Public Safety System 2 are out of the range of their switch
controller. In some emergency situations, however, a local, temporary repeater
that is compatible with the mobile units associated with Public Safety System 2
can be located in the vicinity of the incident. If such a repeater could be in-
stalled, the gateway solution could then be used to bridge the channels together
to provide temporary interoperability.
35
The above discussion highlights why the lack of interoperability of today's
public safety systems is not easily rectified. To be sure, narrowband interop-
erability issues for local first responder personnel would be minimized if every
public safety agency used a P25 system operating in the 700 MHz or 800 MHz
band. Such a strategy would reduce the complexity of achieving interoperabil-
ity, even if the P25 systems operated in different bands, because it would fa-
cilitate the core network-based gateway solution. Indeed, this is the dominant
strategy now being used by many states, which are seeking to deploy state-
35 Interoperability problems between two jurisdictions can be minimized by increasing
the amount of coverage overlap between the two systems. Indeed, under existing conditions,
there are incentives for different agencies to create overlapping coverage to facilitate inter-
operability in situations requiring mutual aid. However, extending coverage in this way, for
the sole purpose of facilitating interoperability in emergencies, can be spectrum inefficient
because it reduces the amount of frequency reuse that can be obtained in public safety spec-
trum allocations and allotments. See Jon M. Peha, How America's Fragmented Approach to
Public Safety Wastes Money and Spectrum, 31 TELECOMM. POL'Y 605 (2007).
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wide, multi-channel trunked systems that address interoperability and reduce
the reliance on fragmented, localized systems. Such a strategy comes at a high
cost, however, as the P25 narrowband technology cannot support broadband
applications and prevents public safety agencies from leveraging commercial
broadband developments.
The principal short-term alternative to the use of P25 systems is a reliance
on gateway or network-based solutions. These solutions, while appealing as
strategies to solve interoperability problems at a lower cost than the P25
model, have drawbacks and are thus not an efficient or effective long-term
solution. These drawbacks include: (1) spectrum inefficiency-taking two or
more channels when one would do; (2) the possibility of a decrease in voice
quality in translating from one technology or standard to another; and (3) the
requirement that both sets of mobile units have access to their respective sys-
tems-which may not always be the case, especially in rural and remote areas.
In such a situation-in which the mobile units are outside of their coverage
range-the talk-around function becomes essential. If unavailable, a repeater
or mobile satellite system may need to be employed, which could be achieved
through a multi-function, multi-band, end-user device.
C. Requirements and Other Ingredients for a Next Generation Public Safety
Network
1. A High Level View
Telecommunications networks worldwide are evolving toward a converged,
broadband, Internet Protocol ("IP")-based network-of-networks model. This
NGN architecture envisions the development and deployment of networks that
are capable of supporting voice, data, image, and video applications (including
multimedia services) over individual or multiple types of infrastructures. 36 In
essence, an NGN for public safety is envisioned as part of this evolution.
Under an NGN perspective, the future of public safety networks would be
IP-based. In particular, the IP layer of the IP protocol suite defines the manner
in which a packet of information is organized and structured and then routed
on a packet-switched basis over various transmission media. A packet of in-
formation is a collection of bits including voice, data, image, or video content.
36 See TIA TECHNICAL COMMIrTEE, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS Focus GROUP,
CONVERGING NGN TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK-TIA PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES 1-3 (2006),
available at
http://docbox.etsi.org/workshop/gsclI 1/GSC1 I_GTSC4/gscl l_gtsc4_3l%20TIA%20TCNG
NFG%20Technical%20FrameworkPrinciples%20and%201ssues.doc.
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By way of analogy, a packet of information can be viewed as akin to the stan-
dardized shipping containers used in the transportation industry. A standard-
ized container facilitates the shipping and handling of a wide range of goods
such as television sets, clothing, and industrial goods on a wide range of trans-
portation infrastructure platforms, including ships, barges, railroad flatcars, and
trucks. Similarly, an IP packet can handle the whole range of information types
on a wide range of transmission media, including copper wire, fiber optic ca-
ble, or wireless.
To appreciate the power of IP-based technology, consider how it supports
the transmission of a typical emergency message. In such a network, any stan-
dardized packet of voice content can originate in an officer's handset, travel
over a wireless access network connection and a core network connection
(over an optical fiber cable), reach a wired access network (copper or fiber),
and connect to a console used by a public safety dispatcher. For systems or
devices that are not IP-based, gateways can be provided that take the end-user
information content (and associated signaling messages on the non-IP side)
and convert them to ensure compatibility with the IP-based network on the
other side and vice versa. To continue the transportation analogy, this would be
similar to unpacking a container of television sets and specially repacking them
for transportation in an aircraft incapable of handling the standardized con-
tainer.
While an IP-based network can efficiently support traffic of varying urgen-
cies and importance, the system must be designed to prioritize and manage the
traffic accordingly. This is necessary to ensure that, in the case of mission-
critical public safety voice communications, the packets of signaling informa-
tion and content are delivered in a reliable and timely way, whether the under-
lying platform is operated on a private or commercial basis. The technical ap-
proaches to achieve this are known, although they are not available in all of
today's off-the-shelf IP-based products.
2. Specific Public Safety Requirements and Associated Principles
There are two basic scenarios under which the public safety mission-critical
voice communications needs could be met in the future. In the first scenario,
mission-critical voice communications (and low-speed data services) would be
maintained on traditional multi-channel trunked systems optimized for such
communications (e.g., P25 systems) while the next generation, common user
broadband network would be used to meet advanced broadband data, image,
and video communications requirements. In the other scenario, the mission-
critical voice communications traffic would be carried on the converged public
safety NGN along with the advanced data services, once that network proved
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that it could meet voice-dispatch requirements. Of the two options, the prefer-
able one is to carry voice, data, image, and video traffic on a fully converged
network because economies of scale can be captured, spectrum efficiency im-
proved, and the need for gateways reduced. Thus, requirements for public
safety's mission-critical voice communications must be included in the initial
specifications for the public safety NGN. These needs include the rapid call
setup and group calling capabilities representative of modem narrowband pub-
lic safety systems, as well as the other features including multiple talk-groups,
talk-around capabilities, multi-level priority access, preemption, and end-to-
end encryption for privacy and security.
Beyond the traditional voice dispatch requirements, a public safety NGN
system must support a wide range of "data services" (i.e., applications). Such
services would include support for real-time voice connections to the public
switched telephone network, e-mail and text messaging, high resolution still
image and streaming video transmission, Intemet/Intranet access to databases,
and telemetry transmissions. During the Roundtable discussions, however,
participants noted that certain bandwidth-intensive applications, such as
streaming video from fixed locations could be off-loaded to other networks,
including broadband networks operating in the 4.9 GHz public safety band or
other commercial networks.
Out of practical necessity, existing public safety narrowband systems will
need to remain in place as critical components of the public safety communica-
tions infrastructure for decades to come. Nonetheless, the core of the NGN
public safety system, coupled with appropriate gateways, can and should be
used to achieve interoperability between the dispatch and other narrowband
services provided on the access networks associated with the new NGN system
and the dispatch and narrowband data services provided on legacy (e.g., P25)
systems. Indeed, IP-based solutions for facilitating interoperability are already
being offered by vendors such as Cisco, Twisted Pair, and CoCo Communica-
tions. These solutions have already demonstrated, in deployments such as the
one in Dallas's Love Field, that they can enable interoperability in a relatively
inexpensive fashion.
37
As the Roundtable participants emphasized, an NGN for public safety could
allow local agencies to create virtual networks within the larger physical net-
work. In particular, a local jurisdiction could establish its own talk groups and
operate what would otherwise appear as a separate private network during non-
emergency times, while seamlessly interoperating with other, larger groups of
users in emergency situations. Importantly, this would provide diverse agen-
37 See Jim McKay, Instant Interoperability, Gov'T TECH., Jan. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/103426.
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cies with much of the local control that has historically been associated with
the less interoperable and less spectrum-efficient dedicated private systems.
On all accounts, rights management technologies are a critical component in
the operation and management of an NGN for public safety. Rights manage-
ment in this context involves, for example, determining who can be assigned to
a particular talk group in a particular situation, who makes that decision, and
how it is accomplished technically. Similar questions arise in determining who
is permitted to place "offnet" calls through the ordinary telephone network
(i.e., the Public Switched Telephone Network or "PSTN"), whose calls have
priority, and who can preempt calls already in progress.
In terms of the broad principles to guide the development of an NGN for
public safety, Roundtable participants discussed a series of key issues. In par-
ticular, they emphasized the importance of reliability, security, openness,
modularity, extensibility, and reliance on commercial, broadly supported stan-
dards. While the importance of the first two (reliability and security) is self-
evident in the public safety environment, the latter four (openness, modularity,
extensibility, and reliance on commercial standards) deserve some elaboration.
Openness refers to standards that are available for use by all and freely
available without undue restrictions on their use. Modularity refers to the de-
composition of complex hardware or software systems into smaller subsystems
that interact with each other through well-defined interfaces. Modularity (or
layering, in the protocol sense) coupled with open, standardized interfaces
ensures the potential of continued innovation because it facilitates the introduc-
tion of new technologies, and allows new applications to develop and deploy
without disturbing other subsystems.
Extensibility refers to the ability of a system or subsystem to be extended or
customized to provide new capabilities. An example of a system that is not
extensible is one that does not scale well-that is, its performance in some
important dimension decreases if new functionality is added. Because of rapid
changes in technology and the increasingly complex demands placed upon
public safety agencies, these goals of openness, modularity, and extensibility
are particularly important.
Finally, given the probability of continuing budgetary constraints at all lev-
els of government and the considerable resources currently devoted by the
private sector to the development of commercial wireless networks, it be-
hooves public safety agencies to rely, wherever possible, on broadly supported
commercial standards-provided they satisfy essential requirements such as
security and reliability considerations.
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D. Essential Considerations in the Development of the Next Generation
Public Safety Network
During the Roundtable, the participants raised a number of practical consid-
erations that will impact the deployment of an NGN for public safety. These
practical considerations include four central points: (1) the network's available
coverage; (2) the network's capacity; (3) the network's cost; and (4) the need
to interconnect the network with other networks.
38
As a practical matter, wireless communications networks by their very na-
ture will always suffer from some gaps in coverage. Reliable radio coverage in
an urban area can be extended through a variety of specialized techniques such
as bi-directional amplifiers, pico-cells, and distributed antenna systems into
many buildings. But at some point, cost constraints prevent coverage from
being extended into very remote locations such as the third sub-basement of a
major bank building. As many Roundtable participants noted, unless new
methods for providing indoor coverage emerge, requiring ubiquitous indoor
coverage could significantly increase the cost of a network. Moreover, despite
the costs, it may still be impossible to gain the necessary access to private
property to extend coverage or to test coverage, even if it is externally pro-
vided to the building.
Another significant limitation is the impracticability of extending coverage
to geographically remote areas using a terrestrial network. Even though mobile
satellites can provide coverage to such areas, that coverage does not extend to
places where satellites are invisible (in a radio sense). Stated another way, ob-
taining the last few percentage points of geographic coverage becomes prohibi-
tively expensive in any radio-based system designed to cover a wide geo-
graphic area. Combining this consideration with the highly variable nature of
radio propagation necessitates a great care in contractually specifying coverage
requirements over a large geographic area. Consequently, some local tailoring
of coverage will always be required to ensure that reliable coverage of particu-
larly critical locations is provided.
As a practical matter, it is likewise impossible to build a physical or virtual
public safety network with sufficient capacity to handle all communications
needs-both essential and non-essential-in all locations during a major crisis.
As in the case of radio coverage, reducing the blocking probability (or waiting
time in a system where calls are queued) associated with gaining access to a
radio channel to extremely low values under extreme load conditions becomes
38 These principal considerations assume, as a basic precondition, that the relevant net-
work is built to meet public safety's essential requirements, including rapid call set-up time,
group calling, hardened infrastructure, and back-up power.
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prohibitively expensive. As such, priority schemes, load sharing arrangements,
and methods of eliminating non-essential traffic (when the network is in high
demand) represent crucial components of any NGN public safety system. Par-
ticipants noted that in cases of both coverage and capacity, emergency per-
formance can be enhanced if the end-user device is capable of accessing more
than one network. For example, a multi-mode, multi-band handset could first
try a local P25 public safety network, then a terrestrial commercial broadband
network, and finally a nationwide mobile satellite network in order to complete
a voice call.39
Finally, practical necessity concerns dictate that a public safety NGN must
be able to interconnect with other networks both routinely and in times of cri-
sis. At a basic level, a public safety NGN must interconnect with the ordinary
PSTN to allow, for example, an official with access to an ordinary telephone to
communicate with public safety personnel at the scene of an emergency. At a
more advanced level, it must also interconnect with a private LMR system
utilized by, for example, an electric power utility with personnel attempting to
restore critical infrastructure facilities at the scene of an emergency. The
Roundtable participants noted that the trend of networks to migrate toward use
of the IP suite of protocols should further facilitate such interconnection.
III. POLICY STRATEGIES FOR A NEXT GENERATION NETWORK
During the Roundtable, the participants emphasized that emerging technolo-
gies, particularly those facilitated by IP-based broadband networks, can pro-
vide all emergency responders with effective and interoperable access to in-
formation and communications. The participants also highlighted that a major
reorientation of government policy, as well as a fundamental paradigm shift in
public safety's approach to their communications needs, will be necessary to
facilitate a transition to this next generation architecture. This Part begins by
discussing the traditional policy approach and then evaluates strategies to mi-
grate toward an NGN for public safety.
A. The Traditional Policy Paradigm
Only twenty-five years ago, the primary users of wireless LMR technology
were public safety agencies and those who used dispatch networks. At that
39 J. Brad Bernthal, Timothy X Brown, Dale N. Hatfield, Douglas C. Sicker, Peter A.
Tenhula & Philip J. Weiser, Trends and Precedents Favoring a Regulatory Embrace of
Smart Radio Technologies, in IEEE INT'L SYMP. ON NEW FRONTIERS IN DYNAMIC SPECTRUM
ACCESS NETWORKS 9- 10 (2007).
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time, it was difficult to imagine the emergence of widely adopted wireless
telephone service, never mind wireless broadband access. Indeed, at the time
of the 1984 AT&T divestiture that broke up the Bell System, AT&T's CEO
indicated little to no interest in keeping the newly issued licenses to provide
commercial mobile radio service. 40 After all, AT&T's McKinsey and Com-
pany-commissioned study indicated that only one million subscribers would
adopt wireless services by 2000.41 Ultimately, this judgment was only off by a
factor of one hundred.4 2
The FCC's paradigm for issuing licenses to operate wireless networks for
public safety agencies focused on particular local agencies. In the 1980s, it was
accepted wisdom that such networks should be operated on a local basis. Even
commercial wireless services were viewed as local-based services and licenses
were issued to local firms. Over time, however, the logic supporting local
autonomy of network infrastructure deteriorated. Because the local networks
were often assembled using very expensive and proprietary equipment (on
account of limited economies of scale), they are often unable to interoperate
with one another.
Policymakers generally provided local agencies with unconstrained auton-
omy to use their spectrum licenses to operate local networks as they saw fit.
Indeed, until a recent proceeding governing spectrum dedicated to public
safety in the 700 MHz band,43 the conventional wisdom was to dedicate all
blocks of spectrum for public safety to local agencies, with limited interagency
cooperation requirements. 44 Similarly, grants to achieve interoperability goals
are often provided directly to local agencies, assuming that such agencies
would find strategies for cooperating effectively with one another.
Given the traditional paradigm's focus on local networks, spectrum assign-
ments were generally made on a more ad hoc basis, with little focus on facili-
tating an NGN architecture. For example, public safety agencies received as-
signments in local VHF and UHF bands, in the 700 and 800 MHz bands and in
the 4.9 GHz band with little or no concern with whether such assignments fa-
40 Christopher Rhoads, AT&T Inventions Fueled Tech Boom, And Its Own Fall, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 2, 2005, at Al.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See Ninth NPRM supra note 4, 38 (allowing public safety personnel to communi-
cate on twelve megahertz in the 700 MHz band).
44 The limited requirements were imposed by the frequency coordinators and Regional
Planning Committees. The Roundtable participants suggested that, while some such entities
were effective in spurring cooperation (including on interoperability issues), the great ma-
jority of them have a mixed record of promoting cooperation and interoperability as op-
posed to simply managing concerns related to spectrum interference (which is their core
mandate).
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cilitated or frustrated interoperability or the ability to migrate to advanced net-
works. This strategy, while borne of decisions made over decades and the
technological realities of an early era, still hampers the ability of public safety
agencies to develop an NGN architecture and leads to networks that are inher-
ently inefficient (as Carnegie Mellon Professor Jon Peha has emphasized).45
The nature of public safety's spectrum assignments makes the transition to
an NGN quite challenging. First of all, some of the assignments (particularly
those from the extreme bands) have propagation characteristics that limit their
utility. Second, the spectrum dedicated to public safety agencies is not con-
tiguous, 4 6 making it more difficult to support broadband communications. In
particular, it is not merely the lack of contiguity that is incompatible with
wide-area, broadband networks, but also the fact that channel assignments are
"channelized ' 47 into narrow blocks. Finally, the traditional model's require-
45 In particular, Professor Peha identifies key ways in which fragmented spectrum as-
signments result in the inefficient use of spectrum and funding. First, municipalities license
spectrum beyond their coverage areas, foreclosing the use of that spectrum by other public
safety agencies. As a consequence, some portion of this reserved spectrum then sits idle.
Second, infrastructure must be in place to serve an entire area, regardless of the number of
first responders. Thus, deploying a few large systems is more efficient than deploying many
small systems. Third, spectrum assignment is limited to distinct channels. As a result, spec-
trum sits idle when agencies with limited needs are assigned a full channel. Fourth, when
agencies do not share spectrum, they must be assigned a sufficient number of channels to
ensure that they have enough spectrum even during busy times. Spectrum sharing, on the
other hand, means that if one agency is particularly busy, users can switch to another chan-
nel. Finally, patching is an inefficient use of spectrum in that it consumes twice the band-
width to create one communications channel. Peha, supra note 35. Similarly, as George
Rittenhouse, a vice president at Alcatel-Lucent, explained in his testimony to the House of
Representatives:
Most notably, fragmented use of public safety spectrum and a patchwork of incompati-
ble systems has restrained the development of interoperable communications across
geographic regions and among various agencies. Further, it has resulted in inefficient
use of spectrum. Accordingly, a shift to public safety networks shared across jurisdic-
tions is necessary to promote interoperability.
Hearing on Oversight of the Nat 'l Telecomm. Info. Admin. and Innovations in Interoperabil-
ity Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 1 10th Cong. (2007) (testimony of George Rittenhouse, Vice President of Tech,
Integration for Bell Labs at Alcatel-Lucent), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-ti-hrg.032207.Rittenhouse-testimony.pdf.
46 Testimony of Harlin R. McEwen, supra note 30, at 5 ("Historically, the FCC has
allocated individual channels, not contiguous channel blocks, for public safety use. These
channels are immediately adjacent to channels allocated for taxicab companies, truck opera-
tors, and other businesses. The channels typically are no larger than 25 kHz bandwidth and
more frequently 12.5 kHz .. ").
47 The term "channelized" refers to the fact that the FCC has adopted rules requiring the
use of specific channels based on particular technologies as opposed to allowing the spec-
trum licensee to determine how to use the spectrum.
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ment of narrowbanding is increasingly problematic in an era in which all
communications services are moving to broadband networks.
From today's vantage point, it is clear that the legacy policy towards public
safety communications will not facilitate the development of an NGN and thus
a new policy strategy is appropriate. To its credit, the FCC has investigated and
begun to act on options for using the digital television transition to spur
broader cooperation between public safety agencies. 48 Additionally, federal
grants, such as those provided by the NTIA and the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS"), are now conditioned upon the development of a statewide
interoperability plan and the establishment of a statewide executive interopera-
bility council.49
To date, neither FCC decisions nor the DHS grants have galvanized strategic
planning at the regional or state levels to the degree necessary to transform the
culture of public safety communications. Moreover, a substantial risk re-
mains that the next round of grants will similarly fail to spur essential strategic
cooperation unless there is some requirement built into the system for the
evaluation and dispersal of funds to ensure how they are going to be used. 51
Indeed, as the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") concluded, "al-
though DHS has required states to implement statewide plans by the end of
2007, no process has been established for ensuring that states' grant requests
are consistent with their statewide plans.",
52
48 Ninth NPRM, supra note 4, 2.
49 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FIRST RESPONDERS: MUCH WORK REMAINS TO
IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY 2-3 (2007) [hereinafter GAO
INTEROPERABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07301.pdf.
50 Addressing this very issue, the United States Government Accountability Office
concluded that, despite the award of over $2 billion in grants from 2003 to 2005, "strategic
planning has generally not been used to guide investments and provide assistance to im-
prove communications interoperability on a broader level." Id. at 3. As to its finding with
regard to specific states, it is clear the funds dispersed to date have not galvanized states to
play an oversight role. Consider, for example, Kentucky where the "[g]rant reviewers at the
state level who are in charge of disbursing DHS grant money to localities have had limited
means for determining whether funding requests for equipment and training were compati-
ble with statewide interoperability goals." Id. at 21.
51 Hearing on Oversight of the Nat 'l Telecomm. Info. Admin. and Innovations in Inter-
operability Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007) (prepared statement of Stephen T. Devine, Chief, Mo.
State Highway Patrol) [hereinafter Statement of Stephen T. Devine], available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte-mtgs/ 10-ti-hrg.032207.Devine-testimony.pdf.
52 GAO INTEROPERABILITY REPORT, supra note 49, at 16.
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B. Toward a New Policy Paradigm
The Roundtable participants largely agreed that the traditional policy para-
digm is ill-equipped to advance the laudatory goal of facilitating the transition
to an NGN architecture. After all, it generally makes sense to operate networks
at regional or state levels and to empower local agencies with the ability to use
information and communications technology as needed without bearing the
responsibility for running advanced networks. Thus, while it is clear that
"[n]ew public safety applications and capabilities involving broadband com-
munications, IP technologies and flexible radios and spectrum sharing oppor-
tunities with commercial providers where appropriate are all in public safety's
future, 53 policymakers have yet to spur the transition to an NGN-based strat-
egy. Fortunately, the spectrum to be made available in the wake of the digital
television transition provides a unique policy opportunity, which must not be
wasted.
1. The Next Generation Network in Practice
During the Roundtable, the participants emphasized that the NGNs are not
simply theoretical possibilities. Rather, they are already being implemented in
New York City and Washington, D.C.
a. New York City
In September 2006, New York City awarded Northrop Grumman a $500
million, five-year contract to build and operate a broadband wireless network
that could be used by all public safety agencies as well as other governmental
entities.54 Using 10 MHz of leased spectrum (reportedly in the 2.5 GHz BRS
spectrum range), this network will rely on commercially developed technology
supported by the internationally-recognized, third-generation wireless standard
UMTS TD-CDMA to facilitate peak data rates of over 2 MB/s to individual
55
users.
53 Statement of Stephen T. Devine, supra note 51.
54 Press Release, Northrop Grumman, Northrop Grumman Wins $500 Million New
York City Broadband Mobile Wireless Contract (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.it.northropgrumman.com/pressroom/press/2006/pr3 .html.
55 Dave Plank, Why Not WiMAX?, PUB. SAFETY COMM., Apr. 2007, at 33, 35.
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b. Washington, D.C.
The National Capital Region Interoperability Program ("NCR") has devel-
oped a plan for constructing an NGN to serve Washington, D.C. and eighteen
other jurisdictions within Virginia and Maryland.56 This network, which will
use spectrum allotted to public safety agencies after the digital television tran-
sition (in the 700 MHz band), will be built to meet public safety requirements.
It promises to deliver users up to 3.1 Megabits per second and average receiver
rates of 1.1 Megabits per second. To facilitate the development of this NGN,
the FCC granted the NCR a waiver that allowed it to use spectrum not yet offi-
cially assigned to it, emphasizing the importance of broadband communica-
tions to public safety agencies.57 To build this network, the NCR contracted
with Alcatel-Lucent to "provide a seamless interoperable, redundant wireless
broadband network of networks with the capacity to transmit video, data and
voice communications."
' 58
2. Strategies for a Next Generation Architecture
To spur the development of an NGN for public safety, this article develops
two strategies-"government as contractor" and "public safety spectrum licen-
see." To be sure, these models are not entirely distinct approaches, but instead,
blur in their application. The essential difference is that the latter uses the li-
cense itself-which can be used for both commercial and public safety uses-
as an incentive for a commercial firm to develop an NGN for public safety. In
either case, however, it is critical that the expectations and requirements for a
public safety NGN be set forth clearly at the outset and enforced upon imple-
mentation.
a. Government as Contractor
In general, the government as contractor model can be quite effective. In the
United Kingdom, for example, the government outlined the relevant require-
ments and held a competitive reverse auction that allowed private firms to bid
56 National Capital Region First to Deploy 700 MHZ Wireless Network for Public
Safety Communication, Gov'T TECH., Mar. 2, 2007, http://www.govtech.com/gt/104189
[hereinafter National Capital Region First to Deploy].
57 In re Request by National Capital Region for Waiver of the Commission's Rules to
Allow Establishment of a 700 MHz Interoperable Broadband Data Network, Order, 22
F.C.C.R. 1846, 9-10 (Jan. 31, 2007).
58 National Capital Region First to Deploy, supra note 56.
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for the right to build the relevant network and serve public safety agencies for
a defined term.
59
The principal virtue of a government as contractor model is that the initial
competition can provide valuable efficiencies-at least if the government de-
fines and enforces the terms effectively. Consider, for example, that a com-
mitment to a period of years can enable the government to avoid paying all of
the capital costs up front. Of course, even if the government need not pay all of
the costs up front, this model still requires a significant government invest-
ment. As Vice Chair of the National Public Safety Communications Council
Harlin McEwen noted at the Roundtable, the New York City and Washington,
D.C. projects are being built due to the availability of considerable federal
funding. Unfortunately, such funding is unlikely to be available for most of the
nation's public safety agencies.
The government as contractor model remains imperfect and requires
thoughtful planning, sufficient funds, and careful oversight to work effectively.
When planning, governmental entities must not only develop their necessary
requirements initially, but also must be mindful of the possibility of vendor
lock-in on the applications and equipment side. Furthermore, discounts of-
fered early on will not last forever. Rather, the use of proprietary equipment
may require expensive upgrades. Finally, firms might be willing to make com-
mitments that they cannot ultimately keep, requiring an effective oversight
process to address any failures to deliver the promised levels of performance.
b. Public Safety Spectrum Licensee
Recently, the concept of using a license for wireless spectrum to spur the
development of a public safety NGN has attracted considerable support. This
concept can be implemented through a variety of forms, including an approach
that assigns a portion of the public safety spectrum to a nonprofit organization
(as the FCC has adopted); 61 an approach that makes spectrum available to a
commercial carrier as long as the carrier can meet public safety's requirements
59 Jerry Brito, Sending Out an S.O.S.: Public Safety Communications Interoperability as
a Collective Action Problem, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 483-84 (2007) (discussing the United
Kingdom Airwave network).
60 Vendor lock-in refers to the situation in which a company adopts a technology for
which a single vendor can charge supra-competitive prices because that company cannot
easily switch to a competitive alternative. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN,
INFORMATION RULES 103-225 (1999).
61 Spectrum Auction Rules Order, supra note 4, 371-73 (eligibility criteria for Public
Safety Broadband Licensee).
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(as Jon Peha proposed); 62 or an approach that encumbers some additional band
of spectrum with a requirement to serve public safety entities (as the FCC has
adopted). 63 Ultimately, all of these approaches illustrate the logic of a mixed-
use network. In particular, while public safety requires certain specifications
for its information and communications technology needs, its uses are gener-
ally episodic, leaving considerable capacity underused at most points in time.
The emergence of the public safety spectrum licensee model owes a debt to
Morgan O'Brien, whose Cyren Call proposal was built around this concept.
64
Building on this proposal, Frontline Wireless set forth a model with similar
characteristics based on an auctioned-off block of spectrum. 65 After consider-
ing whether a duty to serve public safety via a block of auctioned spectrum
was a sound policy strategy, the FCC adopted a variant of this proposal and
66instituted a new policy framework to govern public safety communications.
At the core of the FCC's new policy framework is the concept that a na-
tional nonprofit entity, a "Public Safety Broadband Licensee," would be given
a license for 12 MHz of spectrum to encourage the development of a nation-
67
wide, interoperable broadband network. Moreover, to provide a partner for
62 In re Implementing a Nationwide Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in
the 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-229; Development of Operational, Technical and
Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communica-
tions Requirements Through the Year 2010, WT Docket No. 96-86, Comments ofJon M
Peha, at 4-5 (Feb. 6, 2007) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System). Under
Peha's proposal, the FCC would reassign the license if the carrier did not meet public safety
requirements. Id.
63 Spectrum Auction Rules Order, supra note 4, 386-513 (nature of 700 MHz Pub-
lic/Private Partnership).
64 See In re Reallocation of 30 MHz of 700 MHz Spectrum (747-762/777-792 MHz)
From Commercial Use; Assignment of 30 MHz of 700 MHz Spectrum (747-762/777-792
MHz) to the Public Safety Broadband Trust for Deployment of a Shared Public
Safety/Commercial Next Generation Wireless Network, Petition for Rule Making, RM-
11348 (Apr. 27, 2006) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
65 See In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, WT
Docket No. 06-150; Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with
Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, CC Docket No. 94-102; Section 68.4(a) of the
Commission's Rules Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible Telephones, WT Docket No. 01-
309; Biennial Regulatory Review-Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and 90 to Streamline
and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services, WT Docket No. 03-264;
Former Nextel Communications, Inc. Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions
to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules, WT Docket No. 06-169; Implementing a Nationwide,
Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-
229; Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Fed-
eral, State and Local Public Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010,
WT Docket No. 96-86, Initial Comments of Frontline Wireless, LLC (May 23, 2007) (acces-
sible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
66 See Spectrum Auction Rules Order, supra note 4, T 325.
67 See id. 373; see also Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Solicit Applica-
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this licensee, the FCC decided to make available an additional 10 MHz of
spectrum that would be auctioned off to any interested bidder willing to coop-
erate with the public safety spectrum licensee and to operate a public safety-
centric network.68 In theory, the winner of this auction, in conjunction with the
12 MHz dedicated to public safety, would be capable of operating a broadband
network designed for public safety, but available for other commercial users.69
A critical question related to this new policy model is how the relevant gov-
ernance structure will work in practice. Under the FCC's rules, the agency
selects an applicant for the public safety broadband license and, in so doing,
approves its governance structure and legitimacy.7 ° In adopting the relevant
rules, the FCC did not offer many details, but it did suggest that such an entity
must be a nonprofit body able to represent public safety.71 Moreover, the FCC
set forth a framework for a Network Sharing Agreement ("NSA") between the
public safety broadband licensee and the winner of the encumbered spectrum
available via the auction, emphasizing the need for flexibility in this arrange-
ment. 72 In so doing, the FCC positioned itself as the arbiter over the develop-
ment of the NSA as well as over any disputes as to whether the commercial
partner complied with its terms.
73
The allure of the public safety spectrum licensee model is that it uses spec-
trum, in combination with the mixed-use concept and public safety as an an-
chor tenant, as the asset with which to attract capital investment.74 Given its
untested nature, the public safety spectrum licensee model raises a number of
questions, such as: (1) whether the model will be economically viable in prac-
tice; (2) whether a network can be built to meet public safety's requirements,
including offering prioritization for public safety uses; and (3) whether this
network will attract private users. In evaluating these questions and concerns,
policymakers must juxtapose them against the question of whether it is rea-
sonably likely that the government will finance an NGN in the future.
tions for The 700 MHz Public Safety Broadband Licensee, Public Notice, DA 07-3885
(Sept. 10, 2007), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-07-3885A 1 .pdf.
68 See Spectrum Auction Rules Order, supra note 4, 1 386.
69 See id. T 412 (noting the right of public safety licensee to provide spectrum access to
commercial users on interruptible basis).
70 See id. 371-77 (detailing licensee eligibility requirements).
71 Id. 371.
72 Id. 383.
73 Id 497 (providing for binding arbitration if negotiation over NSA cannot resolve
outstanding issues); id 508 (authorizing Chiefs of the Wireless Bureau and the Homeland
Security Bureau to adjudicate disputes).
74 See id. 396. An anchor tenant is an entity whose tenancy provides sufficient rent to
serve as an anchor for a larger development.
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In discussing the optimal strategy, many Roundtable participants indicated
that the most efficient approach to facilitating the development of an NGN
would involve the direct appropriation of funds (from auction revenues or oth-
erwise) to subsidize it. To date, however, Congress has declined to fund such a
program, raising the question of what second-best option is available. Thus, it
is quite plausible that, even with its uncertain success, the public safety spec-
trum licensee model is the best strategy for facilitating the development of an
NGN architecture. Nonetheless, any such model must be implemented in a
careful and effective manner, ensuring that commitments are kept and abuses
prevented. Notably, the governance challenges to avoid such shortcomings are
significant and must be considered seriously by policymakers.
In practice, the public safety licensee model can succeed alongside the gov-
ernment as contractor model to the extent that local or state efforts work to
develop a next generation architecture that can be incorporated into the public
safety licensee's overall strategy. It is thus theoretically possible that there will
not be a single, nationally driven NGN, but rather an allied and compatible
"network of networks." 75 Ideally, there will be a formal effort, led by the pub-
lic safety licensee in conjunction with a commercial partner, to support this
network of networks. But if the public safety licensee initiative fails, it is con-
ceivable that different local, regional, and state-based next generation pro-
jects-like the ones in New York City and Washington, D.C.-will gravitate
toward compatible standards and will be interoperable. Such an achievement
will require, at a minimum, some national effort to ensure uniformity. Such a
result is unlikely, however, as the history of locally developed systems, which
have traditionally adopted incompatible equipment, is quite discouraging.
The Roundtable participants agreed that there were notable advantages to es-
tablishing a nonprofit board to oversee the development of a public safety
NGN, but emphasized that it must be done carefully and that many important
issues had yet to be addressed. As an initial matter, there was a clear consensus
that one of the benefits of such a board is that it would be more focused on the
needs of public safety than the FCC. The success of the board would depend
upon the development of its charter and membership. Thus, ensuring that the
board serves as an effective negotiator and overseer of any commercial con-
75 See NETWORK RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL VII, COMMUNICATION
ISSUES FOR EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS BEYOND E911, at 31 (2005),
http://www.nric.org/meetings/docs/meeting_20051216/FG1D Dec%2005 Final%20Report.
pdf. The FCC has contemplated this possibility and, as a result, a local entity can construct a
network if the public safety spectrum licensee gives its approval. See Spectrum Auction
Rules Order, supra note 4, 484.
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tracts to develop an NGN for public safety organizations is of vital impor-
tance.76
To ensure success, the board must uphold several duties. First, the board
must be concerned about, and representative of, the public interest in general
and public safety interests in particular. Second, the board, either as a result of
its members or hired consultants, must be technically savvy. Third, the board
must be empowered to act on its own. It is critical that it not routinely need to
seek permission of the FCC or be subject to its review through an appeals
process. Finally, it is important that the board have a broad perspective and
diversity of membership. This can be accomplished by including state and
local officials mindful of public safety funding and management issues.
The success of a public safety licensee model will correlate with selecting a
public safety spectrum licensee who could lease capacity to, and cooperate
with, a commercial provider to oversee the development of the NGN. It is
critical that the licensee be well positioned to ensure that the cooperating firm
meets its commitments. An effective enforcement mechanism is particularly
important to the extent that the commercial firm bid on spectrum licenses that
are required to serve public safety. The Roundtable did not expressly identify a
single enforcement strategy, but participants suggested a number of options,
including a performance bond, a lien that would apply to the license purchased
at auction, or alternatively, a lien that would apply to the infrastructure associ-
ated with the spectrum intended to serve public safety. The FCC addressed the
enforcement issue by calling for the public safety spectrum licensee and the
relevant commercial partner to enter into a network sharing agreement
("NSA"), subject to FCC approval.7 7
One important caution the Roundtable participants emphasized was that pri-
vate-public partnerships and public authorities have a mixed track record due
to ineffectiveness of their boards. Unfortunately, the boards sometimes consist
of unqualified individuals, such as those appointed for purely political reasons,
that do not make effective business decisions. Moreover, in some cases, such
bodies are not politically accountable or subject to any oversight, thereby invit-
76 See Hearing on Oversight of the Nat 'l Telecomm. Info. Admin. and Innovations in
Interoperability Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Jon M. Peha, Professor of Electri-
cal Engineering and Public Policy, and Associate Director of the Center for Wireless &
Broadband Networking, Carnegie Mellon University), available at
http://www.ece.cmu.edu/-peha/Pehatestimonypublic safetycommMarch2007.pdf
("Every move [the nonprofit board] makes will be scrutinized by equipment vendors and
potential service providers. Its leadership must be strongly motivated to serve the public
interest, while countless Fortune 500 companies try to influence its decisions.").
77 See Spectrum Auction Rules Order, supra note 4, 386.
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ing ineffective management, corruption, or other abuses. In creating the board,
it is therefore critical to build in checks against abuses. Additionally, the FCC,
in its role as licensor, must be mindful of the board's composition and actions
without immersing itself in the decision making process. In particular, the FCC
must insist upon a reporting structure that ensures appropriate levels of trans-
parency. There must also be assurances that the spectrum dedicated to public
safety is actually used to facilitate the development of an NGN, which can
include leases to commercial providers that will help subsidize the develop-
ment and deployment of this network. In theory, the NSA and the possible
consequences for non-compliance (i.e., a forfeiture of the license 78) should
accomplish these goals; however, the failure of past commitments by spectrum
licensees creates a reasonable cause for concern.
Underscoring the critical nature of an effective enforcement regime are the
significant cost implications of providing broad-ranging coverage. As dis-
cussed above, providing robust indoor coverage can significantly increase net-
work costs and, more generally, covering all geographic areas effectively will
substantially increase costs. Consequently, if the commercial providers that
gain access to spectrum with a requirement to serve public safety are able to
disregard costly requirements without consequence, they will have consider-
able incentives to do so.
3. The Importance of Flexibility, Adaptability, and Local Tailoring
In facilitating the development of an NGN for public safety, it is critical that
the network be designed so as to allow for local tailoring. In particular, such a
network should empower public safety officials to use information and com-
munications technologies to meet their needs. In effect, each organization us-
ing the NGN would own a separate Intranet-like, virtual private network tai-
lored to meet its specific needs. Thus, decisions regarding network-enabled
applications, types of security provided, and management of when, how, and
by whom the network is accessed, will be made by the relevant local official.
Finally, if a locality desired additional coverage beyond the level contracted-
for or required of the licensed network provider, it would be in a position to
pay for it. In practice, however, it is more likely that such a local entity would
want to enforce the required level of service rather than pay for additional ser-
vice.
78 Id. 523 (noting the Commission's authority to oversee compliance with NSA, to
create rules on licensing, and to cancel the license).
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4. Challenges for a New Policy Strategy
The development of a new policy strategy must take seriously the need to
change the legacy mindset of those operating networks on behalf of public
safety agencies. There are, in fact, three distinct cultural legacies that a next
generation network must overcome. First, agencies must learn to work coop-
eratively and rely on communications technology that they do not control di-
rectly. Second, different agencies must agree to shared-governance rules that
will specify how the NGN will operate. Finally, public safety agencies must
adopt a broader view of communications technology and embrace the idea of a
"converged ecosystem," while forgoing the notion of a specialized network
built solely for, and operated solely by, public safety agencies.
The challenges related to cooperation between different agencies cannot be
underestimated. Notably:
[T]he history of fiefdoms within the respective agencies obscures "gains from coop-
eration." In many cases, managers of legacy radio systems tell chiefs that "you need to
stick with the traditional land mobile radio system" or the system won't remain se-
cure. To be sure, education and demonstration projects are part of the answer because
there is a basic lack of understanding about how modem networks are designed and
managed - for example, security typically stems from effective encryption, not physi-
cally separate networks. Yet education alone will not do the trick. As Chief Werner
recounted from his experience, getting beyond the silo-based approach is starting to
happen where incentives for cooperation - in the form of federal grants - create oppor-
tunities to bring togethe,9groups of distinct agencies and individuals through consen-
sus-building leadership.
These observations are demonstrated through the experience of the inte-
grated wireless network ("IWN"), which is being developed for the Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ"), the DHS, and the Treasury Department." From an
NGN perspective, the IWN project is of questionable wisdom insofar as it en-
visions a nationwide wireless network built for voice communications and
limited in terms of access-i.e., it does not support nor necessarily interoperate
with state or local first responders. Given its $5-$10 billion price tag over the
79 See PHILIP J. WEISER, ASPEN INST., CLEARING THE AIR: CONVERGENCE AND THE
SAFETY ENTERPRISE 24-25 (2006), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org (search
"Clearing the Air;" then follow hyperlink to article) (quoting Charlottesville Fire Chief
Charles Werner). Many others have emphasized the centrality of this issue. See, e.g., SPACE
& ADVANCED COMMC'NS RESEARCH INST., GEORGE WASH. UNIV., WHITE PAPER ON
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 1 (2006), available at
http://satjoumal.tcom.ohiou.edu/issuel0/PDF/Final VersionWhitePaper.pdf (quoting
Garry Briese's Dec. 13, 2005 keynote address at the NCEC: "The hardest part of improving
emergency warning and recovery efforts is changing human behavior.").
80 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT DIV., PROGRESS
REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEGRATED WIRELESS NETWORK IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/OBD/aO725/final.pdf.
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next fifteen years, there is a powerful case for scrapping the IWN initiative
altogether and folding it into the plans for an NGN for public safety agencies.
Significantly, however, it is not the IWN's limited ambition that has drawn
criticism of late, but the inability of the key partners in the project-the DOJ,
DHS, and Department of Treasury-to work together. As the DOJ Inspector
General recently explained, the IWN program was unlikely to be successful
both on account of funding failures as well as an inability to develop an effec-
tive governance strategy between the relevant agencies. 8 Indeed, on the gov-
ernance front, the project envisions decisions between the three agencies to be
made by consensus, but provides no alternative when deadlock occurs on some
key issues.
82
The Roundtable participants generally viewed the IWN project as an exam-
ple of the traditional silo-based culture and recommended a more enlightened
strategy that includes all emergency responders as part of an enterprise. Stated
differently, the IWN model not only fails to develop a next generation architec-
ture, but it also makes the mistake of building separate networks for individual
agencies (i.e., it does not provide access to an array of federal, state, and local
agencies), thereby making interoperability more difficult and network devel-
opment costs greater.
Once organizations are willing to work together, there remain challenging
governance questions that must be resolved. Notably, the organizations must
cooperate based upon a shared understanding of how the network will be used,
who will have access to it, and how prioritization issues will be managed. In
particular, an NGN will need to develop policies, based on discrete scenarios,
which will govern priority access to the network and set forth legitimate usage
policies.8 3 To some extent, a requirement to pay for services-such as video
streaming-will counter any incentives to be a bandwidth hog, but during
times of crisis, it may well be the case that all users of the network would insist
that they need priority access, or at least some assured access, to the network.
While the aforementioned challenges are formidable, they are not novel and
they can be overcome. In particular, some states have already developed gov-
ernance structures that enable different agencies to work together effectively.
In Virginia, for example, the commonwealth developed a well-functioning
s Id. at xi.
82 Id. at 27.
83 Several of the participants, including Charles Werner, Chief of the Charlottesville,
Va. Fire Dep't, stressed the importance of dealing with governance issues early. In addition,
Peter Erickson, CoCo Communications' Vice President of Business Development, provided
the example of Texas's three security levels for disaster situations. Each includes full audit-
ing and recording of who was and who was not on the network during any relevant time
period.
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
governance structure to facilitate cooperation regarding issues ranging from the
use of communications technologies to the use of a common language (moving
from so-called "ten-code" abbreviations such as "10-4" to plain English).8
4
Finally, for an NGN to operate effectively, users must be trained and willing
to take advantage of new functionalities and applications. To encourage such
willingness, leaders must advocate on behalf of the advantages of a new net-
work and encourage public safety agencies to change their usage habits. To do
so, it is likely that officials will need to create "living laboratories" that dem-
onstrate how new IP-based technologies can enable public safety agencies to
operate more effectively. Officials will also need to provide incentives and
accountability mechanisms to change the traditional silo-based orientation.
85
IV. TRANSITIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Working Within the Current Technological Framework
It is critical that policymakers begin planning for a next generation architec-
ture. Such plans, however, cannot ignore the reality that current networks often
fail to provide interoperability on a broad basis. Efforts to facilitate interopera-
bility using the traditional architecture included encouraging the sharing of
digital trunked systems and specialized radio systems. This effort succeeded
only on a relatively limited basis, however, as the price of such radios has re-
mained high and many emergency response organizations have not adopted
them. Just recently, the GAO summarized the pitfalls of the P25 initiative and
criticized the DHS for emphasizing this effort in its grant guidance. 86 In retro-
84 See Chris Essid, Virginia Puts Interoperability Together, MISSION CRITICAL COMM.,
May 2005, at 70, 70, 74; Chris Essid, A Model for Interoperability, MISSION CRITICAL
COMM., Feb. 2007, at 68, 68, 72-73.
85 See generally Philip J. Weiser, Communicating During Emergencies: Toward Inter-
operability and Effective Information Management, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 547 (providing an
in-depth discussion of the intergovernmental relations strategy necessary to facilitate adop-
tion of a next generation network for public safety). In adopting a new regulatory strategy,
the FCC is very mindful of the need to move behind the traditional silo-based perspective.
See Spectrum Auction Rules Order, supra note 4, 370.
86 Even at present, as the GAO explained in a recent report:
[A]mbiguities in the published standards [for the Project 25 initiative] have led to in-
compatibilities among products made by different vendors, and no compliance testing
has been conducted to ensure that vendors' products are interoperable. Nevertheless,
DHS has strongly encouraged state and local agencies to use grant funding to purchase
Project 25 radios, which are substantially more expensive than non-Project 25 radios.
As a result, state and local agencies have purchased fewer, more expensive radios,
which still may not be interoperable and thus may provide them with minimal addi-
tional benefits. Until DHS modifies its grant guidance to provide more flexibility in
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spect, P25 erred by treating public safety communications as a distinct entity,
giving rise to proprietary technologies that are not compatible with commer-
cially developed and far cheaper alternatives. 87 Even putting aside any evalua-
tion of P25's merits, it is incontestable that P25 focuses on narrowband voice
communications and that this technology falls short in an era in which IP-
based, broadband networks are becoming the preferred mode of communica-
tions.
As noted previously, the Roundtable participants agreed that the develop-
ment of a next generation architecture is going to take time and will succeed in
replacing existing systems only once it is proven to be fully effective. 88 Thus,
the foreseeable future will be a transitional state in which NGNs are developed
and used alongside their traditional counterparts. By adopting a modular archi-
tecture, which might include multi-mode radios, multiple devices, or both,
localities can select the best available technologies to meet their needs. More-
over, they should investigate opportunities to provide interoperability on a
cost-effective basis, realizing that, in the long term, the most effective form of
interoperability will be the prevalent use of IP-based, broadband networks.
Even for public safety agencies using traditional land mobile radio systems,
a number of firms, including Cisco, Twisted Pair, and CoCo Communications,
have developed solutions using Internet Protocol-based technologies to enable
interoperability without replacing existing radio systems with expensive Pro-
ject 25 radios. 89 These solutions have already demonstrated, in deployments
such as one in Dallas's Love Field, that they can enable interoperability in a
relatively inexpensive fashion. 90 Moreover, with emerging technologies like
mesh networking systems, radios connected through such solutions can even
communicate directly with one another and without the aid of a central gate-
purchasing communications equipment, states and localities are likely to continue to
purchase expensive equipment that provides them with minimal additional benefits.
GAO INTEROPERABILITY REPORT, supra note 49, at 4.
87 See Rouleau, supra note 31, at 98, 103.
88 Mark Adams, Chief Architect, Networks & Communications of Northrop Grumman
IT, suggested that there will likely be a ten to fifteen year transition period. On this point,
Joe Hanna, former President of APCO, emphasized the importance of not "chopping off'
old technologies before new ones were established as reliable and sufficient to meet the
needs of public safety. However, Jon Peha, Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineer-
ing at Carnegie Mellon University, stressed that even though it will be a long transition
period, requirements should be imposed on new technologies to ensure that they eventually
replace the legacy systems.
89 See, e.g., CISCO SYSTEMS, BEYOND RADIO: REDEFINING INTEROPERABILITY TO
ENHANCE PUBLIC SAFETY (2007), available at
http://www.cisco.com/application/pdf/en/us/guest/products/ps6718/c 1244/cdccont_0900aec
d80535985.pdf.
90 McKay, supra note 37.
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way.9 1 Finally, such solutions can also, through the use of encryption technol-
ogy, address security concerns and even provide users of the system with
"Type I encryption" used by the United States military. 92 Certainly, such solu-
tions are imperfect, but they do offer cost-effective alternatives to purchasing
new radio systems that are very expensive and technologically inferior to NGN
systems.
Increasingly, states are spearheading cost-effective solutions to promote in-
teroperability using traditional LMRs. In Washington, for example, the State
Executive Interoperability Committee is promoting the use of a voice over
Internet Protocol ("VoIP") backbone network to enable state and local agen-
cies using a variety of different radio frequencies to interoperate with one an-
other. 93 To that same end, the Olympic Public Safety Communications Alli-
ance Network ("OPSCAN"), which is using Twisted Pair's WAVE technol-
ogy, operates a network that provides for interoperability among forty-two
agencies and organizations in five counties. 94 Notably, this interoperability
occurs among agencies with disparate environments, including VHF, UHF,
700 MHz, and 800 MHz frequencies. Significantly, the IWN network is using
a similar technology to address interoperability issues.
95
In short, during the transition period from today's traditional systems to a
next generation system, local agencies should not only adopt interoperability
91 See, e.g., Donny Jackson, Vendor Says New Release Will Deliver Nationwide Inter-
operable Communications, MOBILE RADIO TECH., Apr. 11, 2007,
http://mrtmag.com/infrastructure/news/nationwide-interoperable-communications-041107
(according to CoCo Communications' Director of Technology, Riley Eller, "CoCo has
enabled interoperable communications between disparate systems through a mesh-
networking protocol that could scale to thousands of digital gateways .... With the 4.0
release, CoCo has improved the scalability of its meshing protocol and designed a system
that only resorts to ad-hoc mesh networking when an agency's IP network fails .... ).
92 See Donny Jackson, Big D's Magic Bullet, MOBILE RADIO TECH., Mar. 1, 2007,
http://mrtmag.com/mobile_voice/mag/radio bigdsmagic/. Type 1 encryption refers to a
level of protection, as defined by the National Security Agency, that suffices for such prod-
ucts to be used by the United States government.
93 Spencer Bahner & Dave Zehrung, Interop on the Border, MISSION CRITICAL COMM.,
Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 57, 64.
94 Press Release, Twisted Pair Solutions, Twisted Pair Solutions Teams with Customer,
Partner to Reach Finals for TWO WSA Industry Achievement Awards (Jan. 19, 2007),
available at http://www.twistpair.com/index/news-
app?section=Press%20Releases&offset= 10 (follow hyperlink to press release).
95 Wilson P. Dizard Ill, General Dynamics to Build Integrated Radio System, WASH.
POST, Apr. 30, 2007, at D4 (quoting Jeff Osman, General Dynamics' executive program
manager for IWN, saying that it will use "various types of gateway systems to mix and
match the modern digital radio systems with the old-style analog systems that are still used
by many police departments nationwide." Osman added that the "federal government study
contractor [for the IWN program] recommended an Internet protocol-based solution .... It
opens up the ability to tie together multiple types of radio systems.").
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solutions, but should also use available technologies to supplement their tradi-
tional networks. Although sometimes overlooked, the reality today is that
many public safety agencies use commercial services and products for a num-
ber of purposes. 96 Such services are not only affordable and user-friendly, but
they are increasingly provided according to service level agreements that were
developed to meet the needs of public safety and specify a required level of
performance. 97 Moreover, a number of public safety agencies are already using
broadband connections provided by wireless broadband technologies such as
Wi-Fi, EVDO, and mesh networking. Such systems enable public safety
agencies to access a range of applications, including photo databases, video
camera feeds, and driver's license information.
99
B. Building A Sustainable Funding Base For Public Safety Communications
Public safety has yet to follow the lead of leading commercial firms such as
Wal-Mart in realizing that an investment in information and communications
technology can pay great dividends in terms of the ability to operate effectively
and efficiently. °00 Until, however, policymakers appreciate this insight and
view public safety as an integrated enterprise, public safety agencies will con-
tinue to lack access to the cutting edge information and communications tech-
nologies necessary to best protect the public. As Harlin McEwen explained,
96 The DHS National Interoperability Baseline Survey, for example, found that sixty-
eight percent of public agencies use commercial wireless phones on a daily basis, seventy-
nine percent use a personal digital assistant, and twenty-seven percent use laptop computers
and commercial broadband wireless networks. SAFECOM, 2006 NATIONAL
INTEROPERABILITY BASELINE SURVEY 45 (2006), available at
http://64.210.244.119/NR/rdonlyres/40E2381C-5D30-4C9C-AB81 -
9CBC2A478028/0/2006NationallnteroperabilityBaselineSurvey.pdf.
97 Justin Schmid, Upward Mobility, MISSION CRITICAL COMM., July 2006, at 44, 51
(noting that over eighty percent of Verizon Wireless transmission sites in Florida were built
with their own backup power generators to enable them to function in case of a power out-
age during an emergency).
98 Russell H. Fox & Jennifer A. Lewis, Whither WiMax?, MISSION CRITICAL COMM.,
Mar. 2006, at 48, 51; Mannie Garza, EnMESHed, PUB. SAFETY COMM., Dec. 2006, at 46, 47
(discussing Motorola Mesh Enabled Architecture purchased by the City of Providence); id.
at 48 (discussing Tropos mesh network adopted by the City of Tucson); id. at 51 (discussing
PacketHop system); TROPos NETWORKS, METRO-SCALE WI-FI FOR PUBLIC SAFETY: SAN
MATEO POLICE DEPARTMENT (2004), available at
http://www.tropos.com/pdf/SMPDCasestudy.pdf.
99 Fox & Lewis, supra note 98, at 51-52.
100 Marc L. Songini, Wal-Mart Details its RFID Journey, INFO WORLD, Mar. 2, 2006,
http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/03/02/76038_HNwalmartrfid l.html (discussing some
of the benefits of Wal-Mart's RFID system, including tripling the rate of replenishing out-
of-stock items).
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"[o]ur public safety users who should have the best, most advanced, and most
robust capabilities too often must rely on systems that are inadequate for their
needs today, much less the expanded responsibilities with which they will con-
tinue to be charged in the future."''
l
In many respects, the near-term presents the most challenging funding de-
mands of all-policymakers must make do with legacy systems as well as fa-
cilitate the development of a next generation system. Ultimately, once a next
generation system is well-proven and adopted by public safety agencies, there
may be an opportunity for those agencies to abandon their legacy equipment
and their traditional spectrum allocations. But such a day is both far off and
uncertain. Until then, policymakers face the dual challenges of facilitating the
development of the best possible technologies to work in conjunction with
existing systems as well as laying the groundwork for a next generation archi-
tecture.
The funding challenges related to public safety communications are often
discussed in policy circles as one-time issues related to solving the interopera-
bility problem. Again, the ultimate solution is the effective development and
widespread adoption of NGNs. Like the issues related to the upgrade of the
E911 system, however, policymakers often fail to develop dedicated revenue
streams to support public safety's technology needs. Indeed, even where they
have done so, they have sometimes failed to use those funds for their intended102
purposes.
Finally, when discussing proposals such as the public safety spectrum licen-
see proposal, some emphasize that the spectrum could be monetized to support
the development of public safety technologies and mistakenly suggest that as a
substitute for public support. This approach, however, does not relieve public
safety agencies of the need to pay for the adoption of new technologies. After
all, such proposals envision that public safety agencies would, at least for the
foreseeable future, maintain their traditional LMRs while paying additional
funds for access to an NGN. Consequently, even under the public safety licen-
101 Testimony of Harlin R. McEwen, supra note 30.
102 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATES' COLLECTION AND USE OF FUNDS
FOR WIRELESS ENHANCED 911 SERVICES 17-20 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06338.pdf; see also Letter from William P. Challice, Audit
Dir., State of N.Y. Office of the State Comptroller, to Wayne E. Bennett, Superintendent,
Div. of State Police, Randy Daniels, Sec'y of State, Dep't of State, and Andrew Eristoff,
Acting Comm'r, Dep't of Taxation & Fin. (Feb. 18, 2004), available at
http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093004/03f9.pdf (finding that between August 2002
and June 2003, more than forty percent of funds earmarked for expanding 911 capabilities
were diverted for general budget relief in New York State).
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see model-as well as the government as contractor model-there is an essen-
tial need for an investment in public safety's use of cutting-edge technologies.
C. Developing Clear Requirements, Specifications, and Standards That Will
Meet Public Safety Needs
The Roundtable briefly discussed methods of developing the technologies
that will comprise an NGN. By all accounts, any national body interested in
promoting an NGN will face the question of how to promote and ensure the
adoption of some standardized architecture. At one level, the commitment to
use IP-compatible technologies provides an important assurance that all sys-
tems will be reasonably compatible (able to exchange IP packets across a
wired backbone). However, that commitment does not imply that all mobile
devices will be able to communicate with the nearest base station tower or that
all applications will work properly across administrative boundaries. Thus, it is
important to appreciate that an effective public safety communications ecosys-
tem will benefit from a defined set of standards that supports critical applica-
tions and encourages a variety of vendors to compete to meet public safety's
needs.
In terms of standardization efforts, there was widespread agreement that
Internet Protocol-based technologies would form the basis of a next generation
network. Nonetheless, many participants emphasized that there still exists a
critical need for the public safety community to define the requirements of
important applications and for technologies to be adapted to meet those spe-
cific needs. Although rights management technologies are already widely de-
ployed to enable large enterprise businesses like Wal-Mart to operate a virtual
private network with access to a variety of information regulated by rights
management,1°3 such technologies must be adapted to the public safety con-
text.
The federal government has already started to support the development of
next generation standards for public safety, but considerable work remains.
103 Such technologies would, for example, enable numerous individuals and firms to
have access to the company's network, but would restrict access to employee records, sup-
ply chain information, and accounting records. Similarly, a system of rights management in
the public safety context would allow all agencies to share an Intranet-like service, but
would, for instance, restrict access to criminal histories to police and medical information to
emergency medical personnel. See generally Barry Bozeman & Stuart Bretschneider, Public
Management Information Systems: Theory and Prescription, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 475
(1986) (discussing the differences between rights management systems developed in the
private context and those needed in the public setting).
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Both SAFECOM1 °4 and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 10 5
for example, are involved in an initiative to determine how VoIP can be used
to support public safety, but it is still at a very preliminary stage.'0 6 Nonethe-
less, efforts to develop standards need not, and should not, seek to replicate or
substitute for commercial development. Rather, as Doug Smith, Ericsson Ex-
ecutive Vice President and General Manager of Government Solutions, em-
phasized, they should follow commercial standards activity and highlight the
requirements that must be included within the commercially developed stan-
dards. Indeed, Smith noted that Ericsson was mindful that public safety agen-
cies could benefit from next generation technology and Ericsson was already
focused on the need for the commercial standards development process to de-
velop the architecture for NGN standards.
The most controversial question related to the development of standards is
how public safety entities should embrace a single air interface.' 0 7 Smith
stressed the importance of choosing a single air interface, noting that a multi-
mode radio that could provide both broadband and P25 access would be most
economical. Smith said that without a single air interface, a true multi-mode
radio based on multiple standards would not be economical. However, any
effort to choose an air interface would risk slowing the development of next
generation products for public safety and possibly repeat the P25 failure to
deliver competitively provided and affordable equipment. Consequently, some
champion the alternative approach of defining performance requirements and
leaving it to the market to determine whether that would be provided via a
single air interface. The risk of this approach is that it would require users to
purchase multi-mode radios to be assured of ubiquitous coverage.
The attractiveness of a multi-mode access device would increase substan-
tially if the costs of the relevant chipset decline. Nevertheless, the cost of addi-
tional modes of operation will never fall to zero. Without pre-defined stan-
104 SAFECOM is an entity within the DHS's Office for Interoperability and Compatibil-
ity. It is charged with developing standards to promote interoperability between first re-
sponders. See About SAFECOM,
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/about/default.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
105 The National Institute of Standards and Technology is the agency within the U.S.
Commerce Department's Technology Administration whose mission is promoting the fed-
eral government's standards development efforts. See Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech.,
Mission, Vision, and Core Competencies,
http://www.nist.gov/publicaffairs/nist mission.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
106 See SAFECOM, ROUNDTABLE ON PUBLIC SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY AND VOICE OVER
INTERNET PROTOCOL (VOIP) 3 (2006), available at
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/technology/1293_roundtableon.htm
(follow hyperlink to report).
107 An air interface is the technology that defines the communications link between a
mobile device and its active base station.
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dards, however, it is unclear how many modes each handset must support in
order to work effectively in most scenarios. Alternatively, by endorsing a vari-
ety of interfaces, public safety entities could leave some discretion to equip-
ment developers and network operators in a manner that strikes a sound bal-
ance between standardization and market experimentation. Finally, this debate
might well become moot to the extent that commercial licensees operating in
nearby bands all adopt a particular technology and thereby create huge econo-
mies of scale, and a powerful incentive, for public safety entities to embrace
that technology. 1
08
D. Research and Development Efforts That Can Lead to Transformative
Technologies
The ongoing development of software defined/cognitive radio'0 9 presents
dramatic opportunities for a more efficient and more effective use of spectrum
dedicated to public safety agencies. Notably, policies that embrace cognitive
and software defined capabilities represent a logical evolution of spectrum
policy trends over the past twenty-five years."l 0 Moreover, in principle, "[t]he
flexibility inherent in [software defined radio] technology facilitates multi-
protocol, multi-band, and multi-service devices that can operate across multi-
ple systems, thereby supporting the 'system of systems' concept for public
safety communications.""' In practice, however, there are still a number of
important areas for research and development to resolve, including technical
matters, development of necessary standards, and economic issues.' 12 To ad-
dress such issues, policymakers must continue to support research and devel-
108 The FCC appears to take this very perspective in concluding that the public safety
licensee and its broadband partner would agree on a broadband standard as part of the NSA.
See Spectrum Auction Rules Order, supra note 4, 364. By contrast, with respect to
whether a specific technology would be required to access satellite communications, the
FCC declined to call for the selection of any specific technology. See id. 468.
109 Cognitive radio technology enables spectrum to be used on a more dynamic basis by
enabling radio devices to become aware of their surroundings and adjust their behavior
accordingly. See In re Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable Spec-
trum use Employing Cognitive Radio Technologies, Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 5486
(Mar. 10, 2005).
110 Bemthal et al., supra note 39, at 2.
M SDR FORUM, SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO TECHNOLOGY FOR PUBLIC SAFETY 26 (2006),
available at http://www.sdrforum.org/pages/documentLibrary/documents/SDRF-06-P-0006-
VO_00_DPT.pdf; see also Statement of Stephen T. Devine, supra note 51 (suggesting that
"new frequency agile software based radios, capable of operating on multiple public safety
frequency bands, can soon be used as a tool to bridge existing gaps between frequency
bands").
112 SDR FORUM, supra note 11l, at 25.
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opment of this promising technology, and they should ensure that spectrum
policy decisions, such as ones related to a new test-bed for experimental uses,
enable the testing of public safety applications of software-defined radio tech-
nology.
11 3
In many cases, policymakers invest in a single approach, ignoring the possi-
bility that technological change will create new opportunities. For public safety
communications, it is quite likely that even the best version of a next genera-
tion architecture strategy will leave open opportunities for different approaches
to be tried, such as one based on cognitive radio. As industry professionals
Nancy Jesuale and Bernard C. Eydt suggest, cognitive radio technology, along
with a rights management system operated through a trusted provider, prom-
ises an effective interoperability solution that can also facilitate broadband
access.1 14 Moreover, other technologies, such as multiple antenna wireless
links or multiple-input, multiple-output ("MIMO") communications, deserve
serious consideration. MIMO systems provide a number of advantages, includ-
ing increased coverage, higher throughputs, and improved network reliabil-
ity. 115 In short, policymakers should both develop today's cutting-edge tech-
nologies and invest in the development of tomorrow's technologies that may
yield considerable benefits in the ongoing construction of an NGN for public
safety.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last twenty-five years, a number of distinct wireless networks have
developed--commercial, state and local public safety, and the federal govern-
ment. In each sphere, the networks have largely existed without cooperating
with one another. This fact is underscored and reinforced by a lack of shared
infrastructure, a reluctance to use technologies developed for the other, and
distinct funding models. IP-based technologies, however, promise to change
that.
For public safety agencies, IP-based technologies can facilitate the devel-
opment of products and services that can be tailored to meet public safety re-
quirements, offer them broadband capability and local adaptability, and enable
113 In re Federal Communications Commission Seeks Public Comment on Creation of a
Spectrum Sharing Innovation Test-Bed, ET Docket No. 06-89, Comments of the Software
Defined Radio Forum, at 3-4 (July 10, 2006) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment
Filing System) (noting that a test-bed could provide the basis to evaluate sharing opportuni-
ties between adjacent spectrum using shared technologies).
114 JESUALE & EYDT, supra note 24, at 8.
115 See ArrayComm, An Overview of MAS Principles,
http://www.arraycomm.com/serve.php?page=principles (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
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them to leverage ongoing commercial development. Such technologies, more-
over, can meet the requirements of public safety agencies without requiring
individual public safety agencies to build and operate their own separate net-
works. They do so by allowing shared infrastructure and capacity among a
large number of users, thereby enabling them to leverage commercially-driven
economies of scale and open standards.
Remarkably, Roundtable participants reached a consensus on a number of
key points related to the development of an NGN for public safety. Ultimately,
there was a broad consensus regarding the importance of investing in and
equipping public safety agencies with the cutting edge information and com-
munications technologies necessary to perform at a highly effective level.
Similarly, there was a broad consensus that a new policy model would be nec-
essary to facilitate the development of an NGN and that local agencies operat-
ing their own networks would be highly unlikely to facilitate this development.
Thus, the most difficult question going forward concerns the optimal strategies
for using different policy tools. In particular, it remains to be determined what
the ideal balance is between relying on government contracting for NGN de-
velopment and a public safety licensee model.
The opportunities presented by a next generation architecture promise to en-
able public safety agencies to communicate effectively with one another and
use cutting-edge applications that will enable them to do their jobs more effec-
tively. But the transition to this network will take time and will require an on-
going investment of resources. In particular, such a network will not develop
rapidly and public safety agencies must continue to operate their traditional
networks, and make them interoperable, until an NGN is proven to be an effec-
tive substitute for traditional LMRs.
In short, for public safety agencies, the decision to invest in state-of-the art
information and communications technology is long overdue. To rectify this
failing, policymakers must realize that this investment is as critical to the suc-
cess of these agencies as providing them with effective equipment to protect
our citizenry and respond to emergency situations across a range of life-and-
death situations. Over time, the case for such an investment will only become
more compelling and the costs of not making such an investment will increase.
Thus, the time to start the transition to an NGN for public safety is now.
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